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THE JAPANESE ROAD TO
by
M ih s s e n  K a d h im  *
Japan’s area is small (142,726 sq. miles) and its natural resource base 
is meager. Its meteoric rise from the rather isolated feudal state prior to the 
Meiji Restoration in 1868 to its present status of a leading modern nation 
with a preeminent economy gives development economists food for thought.
This article proffers a chronological interpretation of the Japanese road 
to modernization focusing on the economic forces unleashed in the Meiji era 
and their subsequent evolution. It concludes with some critical remarks on 
the nexus between culture and the economy with reference to Japan.
1. The Preconditions Phase
The preconditions for sustained economic growth and modernization 
have gradually evolved throughout Tokugawa Japan, 1603-1868, and per­
haps much earlier. Morishima traces back the beliefs, customs, ways of 
living, ideas and systems of thought of modern Japan to as early as the 
Taika Reform of 604 (Morishima, 1982, pp. 1-51). The first great Japanese 
statesman, Shotoku Taishi (573-621) attempted to bridge the gap between 
his country’s culture and the then superior culture of China. Chinese culture 
was based on Confucianism which emphasized such virtues as benevolence, 
justice, ceremony, knowledge, faith, filial piety, harmony, bravery, and 
loyalty. However, the Japanese reinterpreted these concepts and changed 
their relative importance to suit their needs. Thus, if certain elements of
* Kuwait University.
I am indebted to my colleagues Dr. Sulayman Khalaf and Dr. Jamil Taher of the 
Departments of Sociology and Economics, respectively, for providing me with some pertinent 
references and for discussing with me some of the ideas explored in this article. However, the 
responsibility for the interpretations and views found herein is solely mine.
1026 MIHSSEN KADHIM
Chinese Confucianism were deemed unsuitable or undesirable, they were 
either entirely discarded or drastically reformulated. “Although Shotoku 
was keen to raise the level of education of the Japanese people up to the 
Chinese standard, he did not accept everything Chinese. He wanted to graft 
Chinese ability onto the stock of Japanese spirit” (Morishima, 1982, p. 23). 
Consequently, benevolence, the central virtue of Chinese Confucianism, 
was relatively neglected in Japan and instead loyalty, in conjunction with 
filial piety and duty to one’s seniors, formed a trinity of values that 
were emphasized. These values are reflected in the hierarchic structure of 
Japanese society based on authority, blood ties and age.
It must be pointed out that Confucianism as a system of thought is 
rationalistic and intellectual. It rejects mysticism and magic and views 
morality not in terms of following the commandments of an omniscient 
transcendent being but in the extension of the natural human affection 
found within the family to non-family members and complete strangers 
alike. The Japanese, being ethical though non-religious by nature, were 
therefore receptive to Confucian thoughts albeit after modifying them to 
suit their needs. The Tokugawa Bakufu government promoted Confucian 
education during the long period of isolation of over two centuries, 1639- 
1859. The stress on education, the intellect, and rationality embedded 
in Confucianism proved of immense service in moulding the Japanese 
character and in the emergence of an efficient and honest bureaucracy.
The isolationist policy of the Tokugawa government was instrumental 
in other ways as well in preparing the ground for the Meiji modernization 
drive. First, Japan became a unified country run by an efficient and honest 
feudal bureaucracy that preserved peace and stability for over 200 years. 
The alternate attendance system introduced in 1635 was designed to tighten 
the central government’s control over the provincial feudal lords. It required 
these lords to maintain separate residences, one at their fiefs and one at the 
capital (Edo, present Tokyo) and to spend part of every year or every other 
year at their residence in the capital where their families were permanently 
kept as hostages to the Bakufu government. Two unintended yet from the 
perspective of future modernization extremely vital consequences of this 
system were: the standardization of language, social rules, habits and 
customs in the various provinces on the one hand and on the other hand 
the development of castle towns in the provinces, and markets and relay- 
station communities along the multitude of highways that were opened to 
connect the provinces with the capital.
Second, isolation functioned as an ideal means of protection for Japan’s 
handicraft manufacturing industries. Morishima (1982) observes that:
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The relative ease with which the Meiji government succeeded in industrializing 
Japan was due in part ... to the preservation of handicraft skills throughout the 
Tokugawa period. In  order to protect Japan’s craft industries from the West s 
export offensive and to prevent Japan’s becoming a purely agricultural county  an 
appropriate protective trade policy had to be implemented, and by following a 
policy of national seclusion the Tokugawa Bakufu had, quite unconsciously, 
implemented a perfect protective trade policy (p. 60).
In sum the Tokugawa period of isolation served to satisfy the precondi­
tions necessary for the Meiji regime’s drive for economic modernization. 
Japan emerged on the eve of the Meiji Restoration as a unified and relative­
ly urbanized country with a government run by an efficient bureaucracy 
consisting of a feudal samurai class moulded in Confucian values. The 
educational levels of its citizens were high with some formal schooling 
available to about half the male population. Furthermore, the country 
managed to maintain a work force possessing relatively advanced handicraft 
skills.True, the technology being applied was still rudimentary but the capa­
bility to introduce modern technology was created. This gap between the 
actual technology being applied and the existent capability of borrowing 
and absorbing more advanced techniques is, according to some perceptive 
economists, a fundamental factor in Japan’s success (Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 
1973, p. 8).
II. The Meiji Era
The Meiji era lasted 45 years, 1868-1912. It began in 1867-1868 with 
the restoration of the imperial rule and the abolition of the feudal Bakufu 
government. It was a revolution by the elite in response to external pressure 
created by the huge technological gap then existing between the West and 
Japan (Morishima, 1982, p. 58-90). This elite consisted in the main of low- 
ranking samurai who were ardent nationalists intent on creating a modern 
and rich Japan on the basis of indigenous values. Hence the mottoes: Rich 
Country, Strong Army; Japanese Spirit and Western Technology. The new 
government embarked on reforming the social and political system by 
proclaiming the Charter of Oath that cancelled the feudal privileges of the 
samurai class and guaranteed personal and economic freedom and called for 
the establishment of deliberative assemblies, universal conscription and a 
system of university education in 1870 and of general education in 1872 
(Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, pp. 73-79).
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The Meiji leaders were not interested in political and social reforms 
per se. Rather, they viewed them as necessary means for the establishment 
of a new economic order founded on the extensive application of western 
technology. In other words, they correctly realized that political and social 
reforms must proceed hand in glove with the introduction of modern technol­
ogy and industrialization. The government however lacked a clearly defined 
economic modernization plan and its short-term economic policies were 
rather experimental. Nonetheless, it soon became apparent that industrial 
entrepreneurs, those who had to bear the burden of the new era, could not 
be expected to emerge from among members of the farming, artisan or 
merchant classes. Such men made limited demands for freedom to engage 
in business, were timid to carry out innovations, and the capital resources 
at their disposal were too insignificant for building such modern industries 
as railways, telegraphs, shipbuilding and steel manufacturing. The state 
inevitably had to step in to fill the vacuum. Hence the birth of state capital­
ism.
The major components of Japan’s economic modernization program are 
perhaps five. A summary analysis of each is proffered below.
1. In order to establish a market-oriented capitalist economy on the 
western model, a nucleus of powerful capitalists is necessary. The bourgeois 
class that emerged in the later years of the Tokugawa era however was 
weak and concerned almost exclusively with domestic commerce not foreign 
trade owing to the circumstances of seclusion. Such a class “possessed 
neither the courage nor the spirit of adventure which was usually found 
among merchants of foreign trade” (Morishima, 1982, p. 85). Thus, the 
government, through the newly created Ministry of Industry, was forced to 
lead the way by investing its limited funds and resources in strategically 
important modern industries such as steel mills, shipbuilding, armaments 
and infrastructural projects including railways, telephone and telegraph 
communications. These pilot enterprises served several functions: they 
acted as a model which the private sector could emulate; they absorbed 
initial costs and losses which private firms could not possibly bear; they 
solved certain technical difficulties; and they symbolized the resolve of the 
government to turn Japan into a modern industrialized nation (Hirschmeier 
and Yui, 1975, p. 86). Soon however the direct involvement of the gov­
ernment in the economy ran into serious management problems that made 
these fledgling enterprises unable to continue operation except at a loss. 
Instead of continuing to subsidize these investments, the government ju­
diciously decided to sell off most of them save the infrastructural and
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armaments establishments at almost give-away prices. In this manner one 
of the basic prerequisites for capitalism, the existence of a capitalist class, 
had been fulfilled.
It is important to stress that Meiji capitalists, having owed their exist­
ence to government favor, continued afterward to seek state patronage and 
remained loyal and cooperative towards the government (Morishima, 1982, 
p. 86). Thus the foundation for harmonious partnership between business 
and government, which is still a hallmark of the Japanese economy, had 
been early laid. Many observers consider this close working relationship 
between business and government as a key element responsible for Japanese 
success (Fodella, 1989; Toba, 1981; Trezise, 1976).
Some analysts (Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, pp. 88, 146) persuasively 
argue that the involvement of the government as an industrial investor must 
have been only temporary in intent, supplanting tariff protection which, 
owing to lack of tariff autonomy at the time, could not be pursued. As a 
latecomer and in the absence of tariff sovereignty that was fully restored only 
in 1910, Japan had to create its infant industries by direct state initiative 
and nurture them to adulthood before turning them to the private sector.
2. Industrialization requires, besides entrepreneurial initiative, capital 
accumulation. The Meiji government relied principally on agricultural taxa­
tion as a source of fiscal revenue. Land tax in the decade following the land 
tax reform of 1873 contributed between 80 and 66 percent of total fiscal 
revenue. Japan thus fits into the classic development model whereby agricul­
ture bears the major initial burden of industrialization (Hirschmeier and 
Yui, 1975, p. 83). It is important to observe in passing that the contribution 
of agriculture to the process of industrialization was not confined to the 
provision of a large proportion of the total fiscal revenue but manifested 
itself in other classic ways as well. Tea and raw silk were the principal 
earners of foreign exchange which was the limiting constraint on the 
importation of the much-needed capital goods and foreign know-how and 
expertise. Japanese agriculture, which was characterized by high labor 
intensity, not only fed the population that was growing at about 1 percent 
annually, but also prevented the emergence of widespread unemployment. 
Population growth and the possibility of tapping agricultural labor increased 
the elasticity of labor supply and thus permitted the absorption of labor 
into the growing industrial sector without significant wage increases.
Capital accumulation proceeded also via other classical means, notably 
through inflation, the development of modern banking and insurance and 
the creation of a number of specialized banks, and the promotion of a
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system of postal saving. Inflation made a contribution to forced savings; the 
banks, notably the specialized ones, played important roles as large-scale, 
long-term suppliers of credit; and the Postal Savings System was effective in 
syphoning small savings and making them available to the government 
(Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, pp. 90-1).
Most analysts ascribe to the Japanese ethic of hard work and frugality 
the success of the government in its campaign to promote capital accumula­
tion and to earmark the resources thus released for industrial investment 
(Morishima, 1982, p. 86; Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, p. 131; Toba, 1981, 
p. 84). They draw a parallel between the puritan ethics in the West as 
interpreted by Max Weber and the ethics of Japanese Confucianism that 
elevated frugality to the status of noble behavior.
3. Japan’s economic development and modernization program was 
executed with minimal recourse to foreign borrowing. Although a large 
number of western technicians and scientists were invited to Japan, foreign 
capital was not welcomed (Toba, 1981, p. 85). The foreign exchange 
necessary for Japan’s modernization program was domestically generated 
initially through increasing the volume of traditional exports, tea and raw 
silk, and later by adding cotton textiles and a variety of other exports. Japan 
realized from the very beginning that, owing to her poor natural resource 
base, export promotion is sine qua non for her economic development. 
Thus export promotion loomed large in the thinking of the policymakers in 
framing industrial policies.
In contrast to some presently advanced countries such as the United 
States which witnessed a heavy inflow of foreign capital during the nine­
teenth century, Japan was extremely self-reliant in pursuing her industriali­
zation.
4. The Japanese industrialization program exhibited clearly the duality 
feature so common in the developing world today. A relatively few and 
large enterprises, later become known as zaibatsu, dominated the modern 
industrial sector. Most of these enterprises owed their existence to the 
government either directly through the aforementioned decision to turn 
over state-owned firms to the private sector or indirectly via the gov­
ernment’s extensive subsidies and guidance. The leaders of these firms were 
men of exceptional ability and a keen sense of realism. They concentrated 
on long-term development and growth and not short-term profits. They 
understood that “they had to lay first the foundations for a sound private 
economy before reaping its fruits both for themselves in terms of profits,
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and for Japan in terms of an overall viable industry” (Hirschmeier and Yui, 
1975, pp. 99).
Duality in the inchoate phase of industrialization is hardly avoidable 
since a developing country cannot afford to spread thinly its scarce inputs 
of capital, managerial talents and modern labor skills. It is only when the 
modern sector acquires an enclave character and thus fails to generate the 
spread effects desired that duality becomes a serious problem. Fortunately 
for Japan this was not the case (Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, pp. 102-3). 
However, the sizable gap between the relatively few large-scale enterprises 
and the multitude of small firms in terms of productivity, the quality of 
technology employed, and wage levels has not been an ephemeral phenome­
non but has persisted into the present (Morishima, 1982, pp. 165-174). 
Other structural imbalances have also marked Japan’s modernization drive, 
notably wage disparity between male and female workers. Even now Japa­
nese women on average earn about 52 percent of their male counterparts 
(Lauria, 1989, p. 1144). It is noteworthy however to observe that these 
structural imbalances failed to generate significant social tension and dishar­
mony in the Japanese economy and society such as would be expected of 
them in a western context. The Japanese system of values with its emphasis 
on the vertical order, the subordination of women, submission to authority 
and functional role expectation -  all elements of Japanese Confucian ethics 
— helped stymie the voices of dissent (Morishima, 1982, p. 98; Lauria, 
1989, p. 1147).
5. The Meiji leaders, both business leaders as well as intellectuals, 
created an ideology of progress and worked for its dissemination among the 
people through diverse measures, notably the creation of a general ‘mood 
and enthusiasm’ for things western as well as the establishment of general 
education and a generous overseas study program for young Japanese.
A decree issued in 1872 made general education mandatory for all, 
boys and girls, from age 6 to 13, and required the cost of education to be 
borne privately. Within a relatively short span of time enrollment went up 
initially from 28 percent of the pertinent age group to 40 percent in 1877 
and to 96 percent in 1896 (Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, pp. 77). The 
curricula of the grade school emphasized not only the three R’s but also 
western-style education. Secondary education varied in style and included 
apart from the general high school an increasing number of technical and 
vocational schools both public and private.
The system of university education was initiated in 1870 and provided 
for the gradual establishment of eight universities. University students were
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highly regarded and received top positions upon graduation. Those return­
ing from overseas study were accorded special status and were honored with 
the title yoko-gaeri (returnee from the West). They were appointed to posi­
tions of responsibility where they could make significant contributions to 
Japan’s efforts to modernize. It is noteworthy to observe that in contrast 
with students of many late industrializing nations studying in the West, 
Japanese students abroad did not choose to stay there but returned to Japan 
with a sense of purpose and mission. Without doubt their decision to return 
home reflected not only their patriotism and strong identification with their 
culture but also the excellent career opportunities and prestige awaiting 
them upon return.
The diffusion of knowledge and modem education among the popula­
tion was in the long term perhaps the single most important measure that 
contributed to economic progress and modernization. The new age required 
the capacity to assimilate new techniques and ideas and to adapt them to 
local conditions, and the new school system proved able to meet these 
requirements. The emphasis on human resources development was from the 
start the cornerstone of Japanese endeavors to build a modern economy. 
The following quote from the First Economic White Book 1884 (given in 
Hirschmeier and Yui, 1973) hints at this idea.
Which requirements should be considered as most important in the present efforts of 
the government in building Japanese industries? It can be neither capital nor laws 
and regulations because both are dead things in themselves and totally ineffective. 
The spirit sets both capital and regulations in motion... Hence, if we assign weights’" 
to these three factors with respect to their effectiveness, the spirit should be assigned 
five parts, laws and regulations four, and capital no more than one part (pp. 76-7).
The success of the new educational policy is traceable to the fact that 
the Japanese had already, “as a result of the samurai being the models for 
all, inherited a high esteem for eduction which, rather than birth privileges, 
was to become the distinctive mark of the elite” (Hirschmeier and Yui, 
1975, p. 77). The emphasis placed on education was in fact based on a 
firmly established Confucian tradition of reverence for learning and know­
ledge in general. And the Japanese family typically played an important 
role in furthering the education of the children. Even today this role has 
not diminished in importance as can be seen from the Japanese expression 
Kyoiku-mama which refers to a mother totally dedicated to following her 
children’s progress in school; she assists her children with their homework 
and urges them to learn and participate in school activities. “This type of 
mother is fully aware of the fundamental importance of education in
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Japanese society and is determined to help her children in the ‘rat race’ 
which is competitive even from the child’s earliest years” (Lauria, 1989, 
p. 1143).
Literacy, education and vocational skills are indispensable require­
ments for economic growth and modernization. They put down deep roots 
in Meiji Japan, owing to the existing favorable social attitudes towards 
them. Furthermore, it was possible to disseminate them far and wide 
among the population because people had been trained for ages to work 
hard and to be loyal and submissive to their leaders. Once the leaders had 
adopted the ideology of progress that glorified literacy, education, and 
modern skills, it was natural for the people to toe the official line, to fulfill 
the goals of their leaders. Group pressure leaves little room for the indivi­
dual to deviate from socially accepted behavior. To act independently is 
considered a sin. Evidendy such an attitude may be harnessed for good as 
well as nefarious purposes. The Meiji government knew how to use it 
effectively to help the process of industrialization and modernization. In 
the words of Hirschmeier and Yui (1975):
The decisive thing about the ethic of functional role expectation in the early stage of 
Japan’s industrialization is that it was flexible, could be used for the purposes 
decided from above. Once the official line was given, and the public followed this 
line, expected behavior could be enforced by sheer pressure of expectation which 
nobody could escape (p. 131).
In sum the success of the Meiji government educational policy may be 
attributed in part to the soundness of the educational measures per se, and 
in part to the concomitant policy of industrialization that called for and 
used the skills produced by the new educational institutions, but above all 
to the pliability and receptivity of the social attitudes, customs, values, 
beliefs, and behavior pattern of the Japanese people.
III. Post-Meiji Development: A Synoptic Overview
W.W. Rostow (1968, p. 39) defines the take-off as requiring three 
related conditions: a rise in the investment rate to over 10 percent of 
national income; the emergence of a sizable modern industrial sector with a 
high rate of growth; and the existence or rapid emergence of an appropriate 
political, social and institutional framework that effectively exploits the 
unfolding growth impulses and thus gives growth an on-going character. 
According to Rostow and some Japanese scholars, the Japanese economy
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completed the take-off during 1878-1900 (Rostow, 1968, p. 38; Morishima, 
1982, p. 87). Subsequendy, economic growth became institutionalized, 
industrialization fully took hold, and large-scale industries matured and 
proliferated. We believe that Japan’s economic development history since 
1900 may be divided into two somewhat overlapping phases, pre- and post- 
World War II. The division is not founded so much on economic criteria 
per se, although it is possible to discern certain changes in the economy in 
each period. Yet these changes are dwarfed by the elements of continuity. 
Rather, the division is based on the redefinition of the political aspiration 
which had been always the basic driving force behind modernization from 
its very inception. The impulse to modernize had been from the start reac­
tive nationalism. But this nationalism had been rather crude and fanatical. 
It had rested on the chauvinistic myth known as Shinkoku shugi or the 
‘land of gods’ doctrine that maintains “that Japan, being ruled by the 
Heavenly Emperor whose ancestors were the gods who created the universe, 
should be superior to all other countries” (Morishima, 1982, p. 53).
By 1920 the new capitalist order had made Japan a relatively rich and 
powerful state. The exceptionally rapid pace of growth however created 
serious imbalances and acute tensions in the economy and society. The 
ensuing economic and social problems were the focus of critics among 
whom the army assumed an increasingly prominent role. In the early 1930s, 
the army eventually succeeded in dominating the civilian government. From 
then on economic efforts were in the service of the military machine. The 
aggrandizement of Japan thus took, in tune with the time, a militaristic and 
imperialistic path. In other words, the army wanted to solve domestic prob­
lems and achieve prosperity for Japan through the pursuit of imperialism 
abroad.
Japan emerged from World War II shattered and defeated. The re­
sourceful Japanese were quick however to pick up the pieces and to re­
organize their economy and society, and in a matter of a few years, admittedly 
helped by external developments, they managed to resume their disciplined 
march to overtake the West. The occupation formally ended with the signing 
of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. However, already in 1950 with 
the outbreak of the Korean War a fresh Katnikazi (divine wind) had begun 
to blow once more in Japan’s favor \  This post-war phase resembled very 
much the early Meiji period: “There was an enthusiastic turn towards the 
West, and its result was again acceptance of industrialization as a national 1
1 In the seventh century, a typhoon, later called Katnikazi, literally a wind sent by God, 
hit the invading fleet of the Mongolians and sunk most of their ships, thus saving Japan from 
the menace of foreign intruders (Morishima, 1982, pp. 39, 164).
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goal. And again, the role of the government as promoter stands out, and the 
support, and acclaim, centered on the large enterprises” (Hirschmeier and 
Yui, 1975, p. 312). Thus, the aggrandizement of Japan was and continued 
to be the propellent motive; World War II however proved that prosperity 
could not be accomplished via military force and that Japan was destined to 
give up the goal of becoming a world military power; in consequence the 
aggrandizement of Japan had to be redefined to exclude military power. 
Hence, the Japanese in the post-war phase turned singlemindedly to econom­
ics and successfully put Japan at the forefront of the highly industrialized 
nations of the world.
Focusing on the economy in the pre-war phase, we may identify three 
new interrelated developments that were and still are associated with Ja­
pan’s superior growth performance. These are the nenko seido system of labor 
management, the zaibatsu phenomenon and the establishment of new zaibat­
su, and finally the emergence of a professional managerial class composed of 
college graduates. At the risk of painting with a broad brush, we offer the 
following few observations on these developments.
At the end of the Meiji period and as a result of decades of sustained 
rapid economic growth, labor became scarce. The ensuing tightness of the 
labor market pushed wages upward and firms found it increasingly problem­
atic to retain their labor force. Management of large enterprises thus faced 
three conflicting objectives: containment of rising labor cost, maintenance of 
industrial peace, and strengthening of commitment to work. It responded 
with the extension of the coverage of the paternalistic nenko seido system 
from employees only to workers as well (Cole, 1974). The nenko seido 
system possesses several major features such as permanent employment, 
basic pay decided by seniority and status, company involvement in the 
training and schooling of its workers, non-wage remunerations designed to 
strengthen motivation and loyalty to the company, and a variety of welfare 
programs that aim at creating a self-sufficient ‘family’ community within the 
enterprise (Cole, 1974, Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, pp. 188-200). Evident­
ly the system draws heavily on traditional Japanese values, attitudes, and 
group-oriented behavior in managing labor relations and thus is quite differ­
ent from its western counterpart that emphasizes the straight cash-nexus as 
stimulus to work. The nenko seido system has been widely credited with the 
relative harmony that characterizes Japanese management-labor relations as 
well as with strong motivation and commitment and thus the high productiv­
ity of labor 2.
2 The nenko seido system is adopted by large-scale enterprises only and its coverage, as a
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The second major feature characterizing the economy of prewar Japan 
relates to the consolidation of the economic power of the giant companies, 
notably the big four zaibatsu (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda) 
and the emergence of the so-called new zaibatsu which grew up under the 
patronage of the military in connection with colonial ventures and the 
development of chemical and electrical industries (Hirschmeier and Yui, 
1975, pp. 151-154). The organization of the zaibatsu, both old and new, 
took the form of holding companies thus permitting almost limitless expan­
sion. These giant enterprises which initially owed their existence to govern­
ment favoritism began to wield immense power and attempted to steer the 
government towards the promotion of their private economic interests, argu­
ing that what is good for them cannot be otherwise for Japan.
Finally, the third important development of the pre-war period is the 
emergence of a new professional managerial class comprised of college 
graduates. In contrast to the early Meiji pioneers who had focused on the 
adoption of western technology almost indiscriminately and the expansion 
of production almost for its own sake, the new professional managers em­
ployed a scientific, rational approach to business decisions. They committed 
investment funds only when careful analysis of such things as location, 
transport costs, raw material supply, and economies of scale demonstrated the 
contribution of the venture to the company’s overall profits. In short, their 
decisions were based on a distinctly long-term view of business devel­
opment.
The emergence of this new managerial professional class was also 
accompanied by the increasing separation of ownership and control in the 
world of large business. The owner-family members of the enterprise were 
as a rule not permitted to take a large and active part in running the 
business; yet the new professional managers meticulously preserved the 
attitudes of personal loyalty to them. Furthermore, these professional busi­
nessmen managed the enormous growth of their enterprises by perfecting 
the reorganization of business into conglomerate concerns, thus permitting 
more flexibility and independent management at the individual firm level 
while retaining family ownership and central control by the parent en­
terprise.
Hirschmeier and Yui (1975) neatly summarize the multivariate charac­
teristics of this class as follows:
rule, is not extended to female workers. Medium and small-size firms, in contrast, recruit and 
manage their labor according to the forces of supply and demand in the residual labor market.
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The college graduates shared their thoroughly modern attitudes, they understood 
each other and judged one another and business conditions essentially in a cool 
economic rationality. There was a lot of clannishness involved, notably with 
respect to the various schools; there was a strong group consciousness; hierarchical 
structures were preserved, and in fact these highly rational and modern men used 
traditional ethics and values for very rational purposes, just as they themselves 
stayed within the realm of basic loyalty to their employers. But clearly, they were a 
modern group in a quite different sense from the founders of the enterprises into 
which they now came and which they modernized (p. 165).
Turning to the post-war phase we observe the following developments. 
First, the democratization of the political process and the attempt to restruc­
ture the economy and society within the framework of democracy. Further­
more, pacifism was declared the official policy of the government. The 
government also began the disbandment of the armed forces and the disper­
sion of economic power. Soon after the zaibatsu were dissolved however, 
new zaibatsu-like formations began to surface aided by external develop­
ments and paradoxically by the government itself through the sale of the 
giant army and navy facilities to the private sector 3. Analysts liken the 
turning over of military assets to private hands to the sale of government 
enterprises in the early Meiji period with regard to its beneficial impact on 
the subsequent development of the Japanese economy. “Many of the con­
glomerates which acted as bases for Japan’s high rate of economic growth 
had succeeded to army or navy facilities; former naval arsenals were revived 
as shipyards and steelworks, and prospered” (Morishima, 1982, p. 164).
Second, the post-war period witnessed the emergence of three forms of 
enterprise groupings; the reappearance of some old zaibatsu, conglomerate- 
type groupings, and interdependent industrial groupings based on forward 
and backward linkages and subcontracting relationships. These groupings 
made significant contribution to the growth of the economy primarily by 
giving a spur to innovational activities and intense competition among 
groups while concomitantly maintaining solidarity and cohesiveness within 
the group. Hirschmeier and Yui (1975) observe:
The tendency to form groupings must certainly be counted among the most typical 
phenomena of Japan’s post-war growth. On the one hand, individual firms find 
support and protection within the group; on the other, the solidarity among the 
group members tends to provide a strong motivation toward fierce competition
3 The Korean War helped shape a new relationship between Japan and the United States; 
America’s interest shifted from rebuilding the Japanese economy on the basis of competition 
and diffused ownership and control to provision of assistance to Japan for the purpose of 
playing the role of a garrison against the advance of communism (Morishima, 1982, p. 162f.).
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among the groups; and finally, groupings are often able to jointly tackle problems 
which individual firms on their own would be unable to do (p. 269).
Third, four leading business organizations came into being; The Federa­
tion of Economic Organizations, The Japan Federation of Employers’ Asso­
ciations, The Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and The Japan 
Committee for Economic Development. To these organizations a great deal 
of the efficiency and coordination of Japanese business must be credited. 
They also exercised tremendous pressure on the government in the defense 
and promotion of business interests. Their lobbying methods however were 
not confrontational but in a true Japanese tradition consensus seeking. They 
may thus be viewed as part “of a larger picture of group-relatedness that is 
deeply imbedded in the traditional (Japanese) value system” (Hirschmeier 
and Yui, 1975, p. 279).
Fourth, although the nenko seido system of personnel management con­
tinued in post-war Japan to regulate labor relations in large enterprises, some 
of its aspects did undergo significant changes that contributed greatly to the 
system’s effectiveness. The aspects exhibiting change are summarized by 
Hirschmeier and Yui (1975) as follows:
the unions as enterprise unions representing all employees together; the welfare 
and other provisions having become a matter of democratic rights, not handed 
down from above by a paternalistic employer; the basic loyalty to the whole firm, 
as constituted by the collective attitude of all employees, working in the sense of 
collective self-interest (p. 283).
Fifth, management in large companies has devolved almost exclusively 
to professional executives holding college degrees. As non-capitalist pro­
fessionals, these managers made growth and not profit their primary con­
cern. For them the most important task was “to keep harmony, to let 
everyone feel that he is part of the decision-making process”. Having 
gradually risen from the ranks of the firm’s own employees, these managers 
envisaged themselves “as the pinnacle of the employee pyramid rather than 
representative of capitalist interest” (Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, p. 25).
These professional managers displayed tremendous eagerness to learn 
and interest to apply modern management techniques to the problems facing 
them in the new complex environment. Their strategy in managing indus­
trial relations evolved around four basic premises: the mutual acceptance of 
labor and management as long-lasting partners, a growing commitment to 
investment in human resources, improving the quality of working life and
THE JAPANESE ROAD TO MODERNIZATION 1039
sharing productivity gains, and finally, meeting world economic and techno­
logical challenges (Tekezawa, 1988).
In conclusion, it appears that aside from the important shift from 
militarism to democracy and pacifism, the developments outlined above in 
the two phases of post-Meiji Japan, pre and post World War II, evince 
considerable overlapping and no sharp break. In particular, big business run 
by a highly professional managerial class continued to dominate the econom­
ic landscape and a strong, rather harmonious and cooperative business-gov­
ernment relationship continued to prevail. Admittedly the extent and details 
of government involvement in the economy in each period did, in response 
to changes in the environment, exhibit some variation, yet the basic role and 
philosophy of the government with respect to the promotion and guidance 
of private business, especially large enterprises, endured. Given this continu­
ity, we are inclined to view the post-war phase as a natural extension of past 
developments — a phase in which trends began earlier intensified, matured, 
and came to fruition.
IV. Culture and the Economy
Western social scientists in their efforts to understand the nexus be­
tween culture and the economy have developed a number of pattern varia­
bles believed to be necessary for modernization and rapid economic growth 
(Glazer, 1976). The pattern variables singled out as most important relate 
to the character of human interaction, the criteria for evaluating human 
beings, the nature of human relations, and the orientation of individuals. 
Extrapolating from western social evolution and considering the pattern 
variables that characterize modern societies, western sociologists maintain 
that rapid economic growth requires that human interactions become increas­
ingly based on ‘universalistic’ rather than ‘particularistic’ standards; that 
human beings be judged according to ‘ achievement rather than ascription ; 
that human relations become ‘specific’ rather than ‘diffuse and affectively 
neutral’ rather than ‘affective’; and finally that the individual become self 
oriented rather than collectivity oriented.
Examining these pattern variables in the Japanese context, a striking 
conclusion emerges: Japan may only with hesitation be assigned to the 
‘universalistic’ rather than the ‘particularistic standard and to the achieve­
ment’ rather than the ‘ascription’ pole. With respect to the remaining pattern 
variables however Japan ends up unequivocally in the wrong box (Glazer, 
1976, pp. 819-20; Rokumoto, 1981, pp. 214-222).
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The Japanese development experience since the Meiji Restoration has 
been effected through a symbiosis of western technology and traditional 
Japanese values and ethos. Without denying the importance of the distinct 
mix of the pattern variables in the case at hand, Japan appears to lend 
support to the thesis that traditional values need not be incompatible with 
modernization. If properly harnessed, these same values may in fact become 
powerful levers towards economic growth. Hence the economic history of 
Japan since the Meiji era casts doubt on the universal validity of the pat­
tern variables hypothesis.
Nonetheless, we must not overlook the fact that traditional values in 
contemporary Japan are undergoing a process of steady erosion especially 
among the younger and better educated segments of the population (Glazer, 
1976, pp. 893-4). Consumerism and the pursuit of individual economic 
goals irrespective of social expectations are gaining currency, and the system 
of industrial relations is being significantly revised in response to the need 
to ‘interact with the outer world’ (Tekezawa, 1988, p. 75). In a dialectical 
vein, Hirschmeier and Yui (1975) cogently argue that:
The very success of development tends to wash out the original cultural elements; 
social relations, and other aspects of modern society tend to become the same all 
over the world, in the advanced countries (p. 314).
Hence, the pattern variables hypothesis may be accepted if it is inter­
preted as implying a convergence thesis. Evidence from Japan however 
contradicts it if it is construed in its original form which suggests the 
incompatibility of traditional values with modern economic growth.
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LA VIA GIAPPONESE ALLA MODERNIZZAZIONE
La superficie del Giappone è piccola (142,726 miglia quadrate) e le sue 
risorse naturali sono molto scarse. La sua astronomica ascesa dallo stato feudale 
piuttosto isolato precedente alla Restaurazione Meiji nel 1868 alla sua condizione 
attuale di nazione moderna leader con una fortissima economia e materia di ri­
flessione per gli economisti dello sviluppo.
Questo articolo avanza una interpretazione cronologica della via giapponese 
alla modernizzazione soffermandosi in particolare sulle forze economiche che si 
svilupparono nell’era Meiji e sulla loro successiva evoluzione. Conclude con 
qualche osservazione critica sul nesso tra cultura ed economia riferita al caso 
giapponese.
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I FATTORI
ALLA BASE DELLA COMPETITIVITÀ GIAPPONESE
di
G ia n n i F o d e l l a  *
1. L’ascesa economica del Giappone
Ad un osservatore superficiale il sistema economico giapponese -  mol­
to diverso da quello americano e anche da quello inglese — non sembra 
troppo dissimile dal nostro.
La dovizia di piccole e medie imprese e l’alta natalità che ad essa si 
accompagna testimonia, come da noi, la diffusa imprenditorialità che caratte­
rizza entrambe le economie; gli elevati tassi di risparmio e la rapida crescita 
della produttività sono indici della laboriosità di entrambi i popoli; la scarsi­
tà di terra coltivabile, la pressoché assoluta mancanza di materie prime e 
fonti energetiche essenziali non ha impedito ad entrambi i sistemi economici 
di divenire, nei pochi decenni successivi alla ricostruzione dalle rovine della 
guerra, due fra i piu importanti sistemi trasformatori del mondo.
Nel caso del Giappone la sua capacità manifatturiera ne ha fatto il 
secondo paese industriale del mondo dopo gli Stati Uniti e il terzo esportato­
re mondiale dopo Stati Uniti e Germania.
Anche se non bisogna dimenticare che il Giappone era già divenuto 
una potenza mondiale nei pochi decenni intercorsi tra l’apertura del paese 
successiva alla visita delle navi americane del commodoro Perry (1853-54) e 
le guerre vittoriose del 1894-95 (contro la Cina), del 1904-05 (contro la 
Russia) e del 1914-18 (contro gli imperi centrali a fianco delle potenze 
vincitrici della prima guerra mondiale), lo sviluppo della sua economia a 
partire dagli anni Cinquanta non ha avuto eguali per intensità e durata. I 
saggi medi di crescita dell’economia sono stati circa doppi rispetto a quelli
* Università degli Studi di Milano.
Relazione presentata allVIII Convegno Scientifico dell AISSEC — Associazione Italiana per 
lo Studio dei Sistemi Economici Comparati, Trieste 3-5 ottobre 1991.
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degli altri paesi membri dell’OCSE e il Giappone ha superato le crisi econo­
miche legate alla congiuntura internazionale piu facilmente e con minori 
conseguenze della maggior parte degli altri paesi industrializzati ad econo­
mia di mercato. Il Giappone si è cosi rivelato un sistema economico che ha 
continuato a dar prova di una grande vitalità non facile da spiegare con i 
canoni che ci sono abituali.
Negli anni Cinquanta tendevamo a ignorarlo, ritenendolo un paese 
trascurabile, ridotto per sempre dalla sconfitta a un ruolo subalterno e 
destinato a copiare le cose fatte da altri.
Negli anni Sessanta consideravamo la sua rapida crescita economica 
esclusivamente legata ai bassi salari, come nel periodo tra le due guerre, e 
destinata quindi a una breve stagione perché fondata su un “dumping socia­
le” che non poteva durare a lungo in un paese democratico.
Negli anni Settanta, quando i tassi di crescita si riducevano pur rima­
nendo più alti di quelli degli altri paesi OCSE, ci aspettavamo che i giappo­
nesi si accorgessero che era venuto anche per loro il momento di godersi la 
vita. Invece i salari crescevano, e le condizioni di vita miglioravano, ma il 
Giappone non cessava di essere sempre più competitivo nonostante le conti­
nue rivalutazioni dello yen. Veniva cosi avanzata l’ipotesi dell’alleanza tra 
governo e imprese (Japan Ine.) la cui coerenza si affievoliva con il declino 
dell’influenza della mano pubblica nella vita economica.
Negli anni Ottanta sembravamo aver rinunciato a ogni tipo di spiegazio­
ne e aver deciso che il Giappone era imbattibile. Iniziava cosi la gara per 
farselo alleato. Mentre il Congresso americano emanava norme minacciose 
pensate per fermare il Giappone (e le NIE o economie di nuova industrializ­
zazione soprattutto asiatiche), e la CEE guardava preoccupata al proprio 
disavanzo commerciale nei suoi confronti, le imprese occidentali più innova­
tive affidavano a società giapponesi la produzione e la commercializzazione 
di prodotti nuovi che non si sentivano in grado di imporre sul mercato da 
sole, rivelando cosi al mondo che le imprese giapponesi avevano o si erano 
impadronite di un “potere di mercato” che le imprese non giapponesi sembra­
vano non avere, o non avere più.
Alla base di questi atteggiamenti cosi diversi e mutevoli vi era e vi è un 
unico denominatore comune: una analisi affrettata, basata su valutazioni 
grossolane e stereotipi, e in alcuni casi sostanzialmente errata, della situazio­
ne del Giappone. Analizzare correttamente i punti di forza della competitivi­
tà giapponese non è soltanto un problema accademico, ma è la base stessa 
sulla quale poter edificare una strategia di risposta adeguata.
Dalla formulazione di questa strategia siamo ancora lontani sia in Euro­
pa sia in America. La ragione principale è forse dovuta al fatto che continuia-
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mo a essere prigionieri delle ideologie economiche ottocentesche. Presuppo­
sto su cui si fonda il liberoscambismo infatti è che la dotazione dei fattori 
caratterizzi ogni sistema economico al punto da fare di ciascuno un unicum, 
ma nello stesso tempo, nell’ottica della teoria dei vantaggi comparati, tale 
presupposto pone su un piano di parità tutti i sistemi economici e le loro 
imprese, che si ritiene competano quindi ad armi pari nell’arena del mercato.
Tali assunti sono contraddetti da una realtà che mostra invece come i 
vantaggi, lungi dal derivare soltanto dalla dotazione dei fattori, possano 
essere migliorati o addirittura interamente costruiti mediante politiche agrico­
le, industriali o commerciali appropriate. L’attenzione dovrebbe quindi spo­
starsi sui fattori che consentono, in misura diversa nei vari sistemi economi­
ci, di costruire i vantaggi di cui mancano in tutto o in parte, riuscendo cosi 
talvolta a prevalere su sistemi economici caratterizzati dalla eguale o addirit­
tura più generosa dotazione di fattori produttivi.
Tutti gli economisti concordano nel ritenere che siano essenziali allo 
sviluppo e alla crescita dell’economia l’abbondante disponibilità di risorse 
umane e materiali [hardware), di tecnologia e di capacità manageriali [soft­
ware). Gli elementi che compongono hardware e software, pure necessari, 
non sono però sufficienti a determinare la crescita economica e per essere 
pienamente utilizzati dal sistema ai fini dello sviluppo dell’economia hanno 
bisogno di istituzioni, norme e comportamenti appropriati e comunque tali 
da favorire e non ostacolare lo sviluppo dell’economia.
L’insieme delle istituzioni, delle regole o norme che le definiscono, dei 
comportamenti concreti degli agenti economici e delle relazioni e interazioni 
reciproche fra questi elementi costituisce il terzo pilastro [orgware) su cui 
poggia il sistema economico.
La qualità dell 'orgware è funzione diretta della piu o meno buona 
performance economica del sistema, poiché la stessa quantità di risorse (uma­
ne, fisiche, finanziarie) può essere usata con diversi gradi di efficienza, 
mentre la tecnologia e le capacità manageriali hanno modo di essere utilizza­
te in maniera diversa in contesti istituzionali e comportamentali differenti.
Anche se non intendo qui affrontare la complessa questione della misu­
razione della qualità dell’o rro re , vorrei però almeno sottolineare che il 
problema non è tanto quello di verificare -  ad esempio -  se la ricetta 
migliore per il commercio internazionale sia il protezionismo o il libero scam- 
bismo, quanto piuttosto di esaminare da vicino se è la qualità di quel 
coacervo di elementi che abbiamo chiamato orgware a consentire un uso più 
o meno efficiente di fattori produttivi e risorse raggruppati sotto le etichette 
hardware e software, in un contesto protezionista o libero scambista a secon­
da che sia ritenuto più conveniente l’uno o l’altro ai fini della crescita
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economica. Cosi sembra essere nel caso del Giappone, dove Yorgware (l’insie­
me delle istituzioni, norme che le definiscono e comportamenti concreti) che 
ne caratterizza il sistema economico, è il fattore alla cui alta qualità va 
ascritto l’atteggiamento dell’impresa giapponese nei confronti degli obiettivi 
di breve, medio e lungo periodo, e il suo comportamento nei confronti delle 
altre imprese appartenenti allo stesso sistema economico. Ogni qualvolta 
nasce un conflitto tra breve e lungo periodo l’impresa giapponese tende a 
risolverlo a favore del lungo, quella occidentale a favore del breve. Quando 
nasce un conflitto tra impresa e sistema economico in Giappone si privilegia­
no le ragioni del sistema, in Occidente quelle dell’impresa. Esiste una spiega­
zione economica di questi fatti, o dobbiamo invece ritenere che soltanto 
nelle differenti radici culturali del sistema economico giapponese vada cerca­
ta la spiegazione di questi comportamenti che sono molto probabilmente alla 
base della superiore performance economica di quel paese? La risposta a 
questa domanda è molto rilevante per noi europei poiché implica che ci si 
possa o meno ispirare all’esempio giapponese se non per imitare o adottare 
le politiche intraprese, per lo meno al fine di ispirarsene utilmente.
Non voglio tuttavia rispondere subito e in modo semplicistico a una 
domanda tanto importante. Ma per contribuire a dare una risposta convin­
cente vorrei soffermarmi su alcuni istituti, norme che li definiscono e com­
portamenti concreti degli agenti economici che possono avere qualche utilità 
al fine che mi sono proposto.
Le imprese, ovunque nel mondo, perseguono il profitto avendo cura di 
conseguirlo per l’intera durata della vita dell’impresa, che può trascendere la 
vita umana e continuare attraverso le generazioni come mostrano numerosi 
esempi di imprese addirittura plurisecolari. La prassi vigente nel sistema 
economico è la cornice nella quale l’impresa si muove e ne delimita i gradi di 
libertà.
In tutti i sistemi economici le relazioni fra imprese sono regolate da 
contratti e da usi. Tuttavia nel caso giapponese gli usi tendono ad avere un 
peso maggiore dei contratti formali. Si dice perciò giustamente che le relazio­
ni di tipo contrattuale sono integrate e talvolta sostituite da relazioni di tipo 
fiduciario (Dorè, 1987). Le relazioni di tipo fiduciario implicano che la 
violazione sostanziale (anche se non formale) delle clausole del contratto 
venga vista dalla comunità delle imprese che fanno parte del sistema econo­
mico come riprovevole. Non è quindi nell’interesse di medio/lungo periodo 
dell’impresa far ricorso a pratiche che, pur favorendola nel breve periodo, la 
penalizzano nell’ambito di un orizzonte temporale più ampio. Infatti compor­
tamenti che danno origine a vantaggi in un’ottica di mercato, e quindi di un 
orizzonte temporale di breve periodo, possono essere visti come inaccettabili
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dalla prassi dominante e provocare nei confronti dell’impresa che li pratica 
un diffuso senso di disagio che può giungere all’avversione e quindi al­
l’ostracismo.
Concezioni del mondo cosi diverse da quelle alle quali siamo abituati 
in Occidente richiedono probabilmente il radicale mutamento delle “regole 
del gioco”. Di quelle regole che noi abbiamo stabilito quando le imprese 
efficienti erano soltanto quelle “occidentali”.
In questo inizio degli anni Novanta è divenuto ormai chiaro a tutti che 
le imprese competono più o meno bene nell’arena del mercato non soltanto 
in base alle capacità imprenditoriali del management e alle competenze delle 
maestranze, ma anche in funzione dell’apporto — che può essere neutro, 
positivo o negativo — dato dal contributo del sistema economico al quale 
l’impresa appartiene, ed è in questa direzione che occorrerà spingere l’analisi 
per escogitare nuove “regole del gioco” veramente universali, che non induca­
no i sistemi economici a farsi una lotta senza quartiere in nome della 
“sopravvivenza del piu adatto”.
Tali politiche devono servire ad un tempo sia a controllare i sistemi 
economici più dinamici, sia a favorire quelli che più ne hanno bisogno per 
sottrarre a condizioni di vita sub-umane le loro popolazioni.
Il liberoscambismo di facciata che domina la vita economica internazio­
nale, anche quando è stato pienamente applicato, non ha permesso alla 
“mano invisibile” di far sentire i suoi benefici effetti sui sistemi economici 
più arretrati o più popolati. Paesi come il Giappone, e le economie di nuova 
industrializzazione dell’Estasia, sono riusciti a crescere non già praticando il 
liberoscambio, bensì il protezionismo ma nello stesso tempo contando sul 
liberismo altrui. Non si dimentichi che un terzo dei prodotti esportati dal 
Giappone (e dall’Estasia nel suo complesso), va negli Stati Uniti.
Oggi il Giappone è, insieme con la Germania e qualche altro paese 
minore, uno dei pochi sistemi economici che potrebbe applicare con sinceri­
tà e senza riserve l’ideologia liberoscambista, ma ciò non deve farci dimenti­
care che è stato proprio praticando politiche opposte che il Giappone ha 
potuto creare le basi per liberalizzare in questi anni Novanta.
L’era delle ideologie sembra al tramonto e occorrerà pensare a qualche 
nuovo schema di riferimento che tenga conto delle esperienze storiche di 
questi ultimi due secoli e che riconosca finalmente che comportamenti diver­
si da quelli tipici di chi appartiene all’alveo culturale europeo non possono 
essere considerati semplici “anomalie”, ma sono invece la prova che le nostre 
“regole universali” funzionano soltanto in un ambito culturale ben preciso, 
quello di matrice europea che è stato dominante negli ultimi cinque secoli, 
ma che non è più tale e lo sarà probabilmente sempre meno in futuro.
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Forse bisognerà allora formulare una teoria che accetti come canone 
fondamentale un “protezionismo differenziato” commisurato sia allo stadio 
di sviluppo (e quindi al grado di benessere materiale di cui godono i suoi 
abitanti), e sia alla qualità dell’orgware che caratterizza ciascun sistema eco­
nomico.
Il caso Giappone potrebbe essere in fondo un pretesto per liberarci di 
vecchi strumenti ormai inservibili, se non addirittura dannosi, e sperimentar­
ne di nuovi che rendano il mercato -  nell’interesse di lungo periodo di tutti 
-  meno ostile ai piu deboli, poveri e disorganizzati. Si tratterebbe di ideare 
uno schema teso a trasferire in sede internazionale quello che abbiamo fatto 
escogitando il welfare state, al fine di generare una società meno ferina.
Se invece preferiremo continuare sulla vecchia strada forse saremo 
costretti a tradire i nostri principi (sacri ma messi in pratica con discontinui­
tà) e gli ideali propugnati, lasciando ad altri (il Giappone già oggi e domani 
gli altri paesi dell’Estasia) il compito di portabandiera. Oppure -  peggio -  
dovremo soccombere (e dovremo farlo lietamente, coscienti di applicare i 
principi da noi stessi propugnati) sotto i colpi di chi è piu efficiente e merita 
quindi, nell’ottica vigente e che per ora sembriamo condividere, di eliminarci 
dal mercato. Sarebbe forse meglio, dovendo fare i conti con il Giappone, 
cercare di reimparare da esso quanto ha appreso da noi reinterpretandolo 
con i suoi canoni culturali e quindi trasformandolo per le sue esigenze e 
adattandolo alle sue caratteristiche.
2. La qualità come fattore vincente della competitività giapponese
L’insieme dei paesi economicamente avanzati membri dell’OCSE produ­
ce i quattro quinti del Prodotto Nazionale Lordo mondiale e in quest’area la 
qualità (misurabile con un indice non facilmente quantificabile dato dal 
rapporto prestazioni/prezzo) è il caposaldo della competitività di quasi tutte 
le imprese, siano esse produttrici di beni o di servizi. Nei paesi dove i 
redditi della maggior parte dei consumatori sono invece pericolosamente 
vicini alla mera sussistenza l’elemento chiave della competitività resta il 
prezzo.
Cosi, nella maggior parte del mondo che conta economicamente, l’elasti­
cità di domanda dei beni e servizi è ormai strettamente correlata al reddito 
dei potenziali acquirenti, piu che al prezzo dei beni e servizi prodotti. Ciò 
spiega ad esempio perché il trasferimento di capacità produttiva dai paesi 
industrializzati verso i paesi in via di sviluppo si sia arrestato dopo un avvio 
promettente. Due fattori vi hanno contribuito: l’introduzione della microelet-
I FATTORI DELLA COMPETITIVITÀ GIAPPONESE 1049
tronica nei processi produttivi, che mediante l’innovazione di processo ha 
consentito ai paesi sviluppati di restare competitivi, e soprattutto l’esigenza 
di una qualità sempre piu elevata del prodotto che i paesi in via di sviluppo 
non erano sempre in grado di soddisfare o garantire.
L’incapacità di innalzare il livello qualitativo della produzione si è 
rivelato il tallone di Achille di buona parte dei paesi socialisti, mentre la 
straordinaria capacità mostrata in tale senso dalle imprese giapponesi rispet­
to a quelle europee e nordamericane è divenuto palesemente il fattore com­
petitivo vincente. Alla base di una superiore qualità e di superiori standard 
produttivi (zero difetti) stanno le motivazioni e gli incentivi degli addetti alla 
produzione. Sia le une che gli altri non sono facilmente trasferibili mantenen­
do inalterata la loro efficacia senza gli opportuni adattamenti, ma occorre 
non dimenticare che le motivazioni di base sono identiche presso tutte le 
popolazioni.
Il desiderio di primeggiare non ha gradazioni diverse in Giappone e in 
Europa, ma il cosiddetto individualismo sceglie nei due contesti culturali 
modi diversi per mostrarsi. Cosi in Giappone non è lecito farsi strada a 
spese dei colleghi senza avere dimostrato con i fatti una superiore dedizione 
al lavoro e una maggiore capacità. Occorre una legittimazione alla promozio­
ne che può venire soltanto dal gruppo di appartenenza. Chi avrà dimostrato 
la propria superiorità potrà cosi assumere posizioni di maggiore responsabili­
tà senza per ciò frustrare le aspettative di chi non è salito gerarchicamente. 
In questo contesto non sarebbe opportuno scegliere all’esterno qualcuno da 
porre in posizione dirigenziale (possono fare eccezione i presidenti, che in 
Giappone, sia pure circondati dall’universale rispetto e deferenza, si limitano 
ad assumere la' responsabilità di decisioni prese da altri dirigenti). Se a far 
carriera fosse qualcuno che non conoscesse a fondo l’impresa o che non 
superasse per capacità e dedizione tutti gli altri, ciò creerebbe un clima di 
malcontento poco propizio al rafforzamento dello spirito di corpo e alla 
capacità di lavorare insieme con efficienza.
A questo proposito diviene sempre piu chiaro anche da noi in Occiden­
te che i meccanismi di mercato guidati unicamente dall’interesse personale di 
breve periodo sono inadeguati sul piano sociale, poiché danno vita a rappor­
ti fortemente conflittuali, ma lo sono anche sul piano della mera efficienza 
economica. La capacità competitiva è infatti maggiore in quei sistemi econo­
mici dell’Estasia, la cui punta di diamante è per ora il Giappone, dove le 
relazioni contrattuali sono integrate e spesso sostituite da relazioni fiduciarie.
Le relazioni fiduciarie impongono ai contraenti un’attenzione reciproca 
tale da coinvolgere la sfera morale personale. Ecco che allora la cura per la 
qualità e il servizio cessa di essere soltanto una politica e diventa un dovere.
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In una società governata da precetti che non hanno un’origine religiosa e 
dove i valori immanenti sono i soli che contino, questo dovere ha un valore 
cogente molto forte ed è sicuramente un potente fattore alla base della 
dedizione al lavoro che contraddistingue i giapponesi.
Le ragioni che hanno permesso il radicarsi in Giappone di relazioni 
fiduciarie rispetto a quelle contrattuali sono molteplici e complesse e vanno 
cercate, ad esempio, nel sistema di reclutamento della forza lavoro delle 
grandi imprese. Questa è soltanto una delle ragioni, e fra le piu semplici da 
analizzare, ma certo non la più importante.
Per ridurre l’eccessivo turnover della manodopera le grandi imprese 
giapponesi cominciarono, nel periodo tra le due guerre, a offrire incentivi a 
quei lavoratori che fossero rimasti più a lungo in organico. Ai salari commi­
surati all’anzianità di lavoro, si aggiunsero l’assistenza sanitaria, la casa, 
gratifiche semestrali basate sull’andamento dell’azienda, la compartecipazio­
ne azionaria. Nel dopoguerra le grandi imprese cessarono del tutto di assu­
mere lavoratori con esperienza reclutando personale soltanto tra i giovani 
che concludevano gli studi, e sulla base delle loro “caratteristiche generali” 
(grado di preparazione scolastica e qualità umane) e non delle “funzioni” che 
avrebbero svolto in azienda. Se ciò implicava un elemento di rigidità (la 
relazione fiduciaria impegnava l’impresa a non licenziare) a questa si poteva 
ovviare in due modi: con la mobilità interna della forza lavoro, e con i 
contratti di sub-appalto e manutenzione stipulati con imprese piccole e me­
die dove l’obbligo all’impiego a vista non poteva essere garantito.
In questo contesto l’adozione di tecniche labour-saving non veniva e 
non viene osteggiata poiché non mette in pericolo i posti di lavoro e serve a 
far crescere l’efficienza aziendale. I lavoratori sono pronti fin dal primo 
giorno a una vita di lavoro fatta di mansioni diverse alternate a periodi di 
tirocinio, ed è nel loro interesse che tutto funzioni per il meglio nell’impresa 
alla quale hanno indissolubilmente legato la loro vita e alla cui gestione 
partecipano effettivamente, sia pure in modo marginale, con suggerimenti e 
proposte di cui si vedranno riconosciuta in modo diretto o indiretto la 
paternità. Per gli addetti alle imprese piccole e medie satelliti delle grandi 
mantenere i contratti di fornitura è una questione di sopravvivenza di cui le 
maestranze sono fin troppo consapevoli.
Come si vede si tratta di uno schema entro il quale troverebbero 
collocazione anche i lavoratori occidentali, ma i risultati potrebbero essere 
diversi perché diverso è Yorgware che caratterizza i sistemi economici euro­
pei e quello americano. Al centro del sistema economico giapponese vi sono 
dunque le imprese, non i consumatori. Fra queste sono le imprese grandi a 
dominare il mercato. Il loro atteggiamento nei confronti degli obiettivi di
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lungo termine non è sostanzialmente diverso da quello della mano pubblica 
ed è quindi difficile che questa alleanza basata sui fatti -  anche se si è 
affievolita — venga meno in futuro, con grande vantaggio per l’intero sistema 
economico nel suo complesso in termini di stabilità.
È in questo genere di clima che si sviluppa il perfezionismo che caratte­
rizza le imprese giapponesi e che ha portato le innovazioni incrementali e la 
qualità dei prodotti made in Japan a sgominare la concorrenza, e che conti­
nuerà a farlo se non escogiteremo regole veramente universali, tese a dare 
un ordine internazionale non basato, come le altre ideologie ottocentesche in 
buona parte al tramonto, sul darwinistico e oggi inaccettabile survival of thè 
fittesi.
3. La flessibilità dell’azienda giapponese: da cosa nasce e che effetti produce
Il fatto che le grandi imprese giapponesi (e sono le grandi che stabili­
scono con il loro comportamento le regole alle quali tutte si uniformano) 
guardino alle risorse umane in modo radicalmente diverso dall’impresa an­
glo-americana tradizionale è un grande fattore di flessibilità. L’impresa an­
glo-americana, dove i lavoratori sono raggruppati in base al mestiere (trade), 
non acquisisce collaboratori, ma essenzialmente “mansioni” da far svolgere 
spesso in modo rigido. Ciò poteva funzionare quando i processi produttivi 
erano relativamente stabili e i prodotti fortemente standardizzati come nella 
prima e nella seconda rivoluzione industriale. Ma con il rapido e continuo 
mutamento dei processi produttivi si impone anche la riorganizzazione delle 
mansioni e ciò implica il licenziamento o almeno un processo di riconversio­
ne delle capacità produttive della forza lavoro spesso lungo e costoso.
L’impresa giapponese tende invece ad assumere forza lavoro avente 
determinati requisiti di carattere generale (grado di istruzione scolastica, 
indole e preparazione generale) e specifico (studi tecnici o di altro tipo) che 
ne consentono un uso variabile nel tempo in funzione delle esigenze azienda­
li, che sono oggi per definizione continuamente mutevoli.
La forza lavoro cosi reclutata, non essendo composta da uomini-funzio­
ne, assume un atteggiamento di cooperazione con le ragioni dell’azienda 
anche quando questa, mutando i metodi produttivi, chiude reparti o intere 
unità produttive, per aprirne di nuovi dove la stessa forza lavoro dovrà 
essere impiegata.
Poiché l’orizzonte temporale prevalente nel quale l’azienda opera non è 
quello di breve periodo, la sensibilità del lavoratore nei confronti delle 
esigenze dell’impresa, esso stesso elemento non trascurabile di flessibilità, si
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trasforma in attenzione per la qualità dei prodotti e dei servizi forniti e in 
cura per i dettagli, elementi che in un mercato dominato da consumatori che 
godono di redditi elevati diventano i fattori di competitività vincenti.
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THE BASES OF JAPAN’S COMPETITIVITY
The reasons behind the vitality of the Japanese economic system have 
changed (at least in the opinion of the observers) in each of the decades that 
characterize the postwar period, in an effort of interpreting the economic success 
of Japan. Each interpretation has shown to be ill-rooted, due to the superficial and mistaken analysis made.
If Europe wants to have a strategy enabling it to cope with the Japanese eco­
nomic challenge, it has to properly analyze the factors of Japan’s economic success. 
The West has founded its economic ideology on free trade, based in turn on the 
factor endowment of each trading nation. What the 19th century theorists failed 
to see is now under everybody’s eyes: the factor endowment can be artificially 
improved or even created through appropriate measures like industrial, agri­
cultural and trade policies. The decisive factor becomes then what makes such a 
creation or improvement possible in one economic system and impossible in another one.
For this author such a factor is the quality of orgware (defined as the 
reciprocal interaction between the institutions, rules that define them and concrete 
behaviours having an impact on the economy of a particular country) which is a 
direct function of the good (or bad) economic performance of the system con­
sidered. For example, differences in the time horizons characterizing two economic 
systems may lead to qualities of orgware remarkably lower where the shared time horizon is shorter, and higher where it is longer.
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URBAN PLANNING
UNDER THE MICRO-ELECTRONIC REVOLUTION IN JAPAN
by
T o sh ia k i F u ru k i *
1. Regional Impact of the M-E Revolution
After the Second World War, the structure of capitalism in Japan was 
transformed into something fundamentally different from pre-war days -  
i.e. there was a conversion from a textile dominated economy to one 
dominated by heavy-chemical industries. The “economic take-off” began 
in the late 1950s, and in the following fifteen years Japan experienced two 
great surges in its economic growth which resulted in an unequal devel­
opment of regions and a social structure with many economic disparities.
In the past, Japan could be divided into three typical regions: the in­
dustrialized central regions; the industrialized periphery regions and the 
agricultural regions \
In the mid-70s, the structure of capitalism began to change due to the 
impact of the Micro-Electronic (M-E) Revolution. Since then the high-tech­
nology industries have been developing in the agricultural regions, and the 
heavy-chemical industries have been declining in the other industrial re­
gions. Only the Tokyo area is growing, and at a very rapid pace. Tokyo is 
called the “world city” or the world-wide “technopolitan area”.
During this transformation, many urban and zoning plans were re­
leased in the 1980s. How do they depict the city’s future? What are their 
functions? Whose interests do they represent? How are their relationships 
to social movements?
This paper analyses three typical cases: 1) Tokyo as a “world city”; 2) 
the transformation of Kawasaki from a heavy-chemical industrial city to a
* Chuo University, Tokyo.
1 See Furuki (1977, Chap. 2).
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high-tech city, and 3) Ooita and Nagaoka as cases of technopolis. Through 
these case studies, an attempt is made to explore some aspects of space 
production in Japan.
2. Production of Space: Tokyo
Henry Lefebvre (1974, p. 376) once said: “Not only has capitalism 
seized pre-existing space, the land, but it tends to produce its own space”. 
Moreover, not only does capitalism incorporate space into the production 
of surplus-value, but it also aims at making this production completely de­
pendent on the centers of information and decision-making. Urban planners 
mask such an extraordinary manipulation. The planning of Tokyo is here 
examined from this point of view.
Just after the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese government strongly 
pushed the planning of Tokyo as a national political center, which was 
symbolized by the construction of Hibija, the government office zone. Since 
the end of the 19th century, the population of Tokyo had been rapidly 
increasing concomitantly with industrialization. Marunouchi, the big compa­
nies office zone, was constructed at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Land had begun to become scarce and real estate agents emerged. The new 
Urban Planning and Zoning Act was enacted in 1920. By the end of the 
1920s, Tokyo had become the biggest industrial city in Japan.
Tokyo was heavily damaged during the Second World War. However, 
it maintained its position as a political and economic center. A few years 
after the end of WWII, its population was over pre-war levels, increasing 
in the suburbs, especially in the Tama zone (western zone), while stagnating 
in the central zone. In 1956 the Metropolitan Area Redevelopment Act was 
enacted. Coupled with high economic growth, Tokyo has been strengthen­
ing its central controlling function with the development of its transporta­
tion and communication systems, while relatively declining as to its produc­
tive function. On the other hand, overpopulation and insufficient investment 
in the social environment has produced many urban problems as well as 
air pollution.
Thus in 1967 a “progressive” government was set up in Tokyo. This 
government tried, first of all, to solve these problems through dialogues 
with the citizens. These policies were embodied in the “Tokyo Plan Toward 
Creating Space and Dealing with Air Pollution” (1971), in which the idea of 
a “civil minimum” was adopted to indicate the tentative standard of modern 
urban life, while the plan of space based upon use value was considered
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insufficient. The space plan was limited to promoting the decentralization of 
population and industrial companies, while maintaining its central control­
ling function.
In 1979 the political climate of Tokyo government shifted from the 
left to the right. By that time, the Japanese society entered a new phase. 
Tokyo needed to be restructured according to a new stage of the internation­
al economy as well as to the impact of the M-E Revolution. Under these 
conditions, the Tokyo government made the First Long-Range Plan which 
was called “My Town Tokyo Plan” (1982). However, it was not suitable for 
the new phase mentioned above because the main policy of the Tokyo 
government was not metropolitan planning but community planning.
The following year, the city government had to set about making a 
new plan. In 1985 the National Land Agency released the Metropolitan 
Reconstruction Plan and the Tokyo government made the Second Long- 
Range Plan, making some important changes to the previous plan.
The first change is the redevelopment of the Tokyo bay area. Since 
the 1950s this area has been a national center of transportation, a zone 
for the heavy-chemical industries as well as the biggest center of energy 
services. Now it is changing into an international business zone under the 
“intelligent city plan”.
The second change is the redevelopment of the metropolitan zone, 
especially the Marunouchi zone. Though this area has been the big compa­
nies’ office zone since the pre-war period, it is changing now-a-days into an 
international financial center and is increasingly concentrating all central 
controlling functions.
The third change is the development of the Tama area as a high-tech 
zone, connected with the “technopolitan areas” nearby. Thus Tokyo is rapid­
ly becoming a “world city” contemporarily with the formation of a high- 
tech zone. As a result, land prices have suddenly risen, especially in the 
metropolitan zone. Neither the Tokyo government nor the national gov­
ernment could control this matter which mainly depended on the logic of 
the international or world economy. Here we can find the new spatial logic 
that Castells (1985) calls the “space of flows”.
3. Transformation of Urban Planning: Kawasaki
Kawasaki is a big industrial city which holds an important role in the 
“technopolitan area”. Population is over one million, industrial workers are
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over 150 thousands and the city manufactures have a yearly product of 
over six billion yen 2.
Until the end of the Second World War, the industrialization of this 
city was connected with wars. It started in the period of the Sino-Japanese 
(1894-1895) and Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) Wars and was enhanced by 
the First World War (1914-1918). At that time Kawasaki was already an 
important heavy-chemical industrial city. The number of industrial workers 
was over half the working population. During the Second World War, this 
city further developed as a central area of the heavy-chemical industry which 
means that it was a center of the war industry.
Just after the end of the war, industrialization in Kawasaki regressed 
to some degree, but soon after it advanced again on the legacy of the pre­
war industrial structure. This matter was pushed forward by the Japanese 
government and American policy. In the bay area, land was reclaimed from 
the sea, and many large heavy-chemical companies were located there. The 
First Plan of Kawasaki City (1963) depicted its future as “an industrial and 
cultural city”. The term “cultural” meant an increase of investment for the 
social environment (houses, schools, etc.). However, since this investment 
was not adequate, soon after environmental pollution and urban problems 
arose and with them the anti-pollution movements grew.
Hence, the Second Plan of Kawasaki City (1968) changed its image to 
“a city which its citizens could be proud of”. The intention was to wipe out 
the bad image of a polluted city. Undoubtedly the city government endeav­
oured to control air pollution and help the victims of pollution. Never­
theless, it continued to carry on its industrial plans as before, perpetuating 
the pollution problems of the city.
In 1971 a “progressive” city government was established in Kawasaki. 
This was the result of the growing anti-pollution movements and of the 
explosion of the citizens’ longing for a non-dirty city. Trade unions, the 
socialist party and the communist party linked hands and played a leading 
role in the election campaign for a “progressive” candidate. The government 
was obliged to tackle the pollution problem and from 1971 to 1973 carried 
out various environmental policies. Moreover it tried to encourage greater 
citizens’ participation in government decision-making. On these bases, the 
New Comprehensive Plan was made in 1974. The city depicted in this plan 
was to be a “human city”. It meant that the citizens’ lives had priority over 
all other factors. This plan put emphasis on the importance of civil welfare,
2 For a more detailed analysis of urban planning in Kawasaki, see Furuki (1987, 
especially pp. 799-820).
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a comfortable environment and community democracy. Citizens’ participa­
tion was also introduced in making this plan and all this was a new way of 
facing the city problems.
After 1973 the Japanese economy as well as other advanced capitalist 
economies entered a new phase. In 1975 for the first time after the war 
Japan registered a minus growth. But after 1976 thanks to the M-E Revolu­
tion Japan experienced economic growth and prosperity again. Kawasaki 
changed into a high-tech city, while still retaining its heavy-chemical indus­
tries. The 2001 Kawasaki Plan (1983) transformed some aspects of the 
previous plan maintaining the emphasis on the “human city”. Now-a-days 
the plan is launched but the emphasis upon the creation of a “human city” 
has lessened while minor features of the plan have prevailed. Promotion of 
high technology and international trade in Kawasaki seem to have the 
priority over other aspects of the plan. This part of the plan was depicted 
as the “international scientific-cultural city”. After three years a center 
for R&D began to develop in conjunction with the development of the 
“international scientific-cultural city”. This new type of city was called “a 
campus city”.
The case of Kawasaki shows the transformation of a logic of space 
production. However, the “progressive” city government could not control 
the differences between its urban plan and its implementation. Under such 
conditions it was unavoidable that the relationship between the city gov­
ernment and urban social movements began to crack.
4. Regional Extension of the M-E Revolution: Technopolis
During the years 1984 and 1985, the Japanese government designated 
eighteen areas as “technopolis”. It was a restructured area at the conjunction 
of three sections: an industrial section in which high-tech industries were 
given the priority over other industries, an academic section and a residen­
tial section. This was a nation-wide regional policy, but, owing to the 
limited amount of state investment, the leadership of the local government 
and the resource mobilization of the private sector were regarded as impor­
tant factors.
Here we focus on the regional-urban planning of two areas, Ooita and 
Nagaoka. They are the typical cases where urban planning had started 
before the above designation.
Ooita is a prefecture situated over 1000 km southwest of Tokyo \  In
3 For a more extended analysis of Ooita, see Syoji (1985).
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this prefecture the biggest city is Ooita City which in 1962 was designated 
as new industrial city by the national government and by the beginning of 
the 1970s succeeded in building its coastal heavy-chemical industrial zone. 
The Comprehensive Development Plan of Ooita City (1972) depicted the 
city as a “rapidly developing” one. But pollution soon followed industrializa­
tion while a slowing down of the economy caused serious damage to its 
heavy-chemical industries. In 1975 a “progressive” city government took 
over. In 1978 it made the Comprehensive Plan of Ooita City which forsaw 
its future as that of a “human city”. That very year a new prefectural 
government was set up. Its governor was an ex-bureaucrat and a man of 
ideas. Soon after taking office, he made it his policy that each village should 
create its special product and a few years later he began to make a new plan 
aimed at combining the activities of IC (integrated circuit) companies lo­
cated near Ooita City, the functions of new industrial city and the above 
mentioned policy. In 1983 all this resulted in the Comprehensive Promotion 
Plan of Ooita Prefecture which was practically its Technopolis Development 
Program. In 1984 the city government reformed the previous plan maintain­
ing the essence of the “human city”. In this reformed plan Ooita city 
combined the character of new industrial city and that of mother city of a 
technopolitan area. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry and most 
businessmen were in favour of the prefecture plan, but were not interested 
in the city plan. The response of trade unions was divided: the left wing 
appreciated the city plan whereas the right wing did not. There were small 
groups opposing both plans but most citizens were indifferent to them.
Nagaoka is a middle-size city situated over 200 km north of Tokyo 4. It 
is now connected with Tokyo by the Super Express Line and superhighway. 
However, owing to its heavy snowfalls, in this city industrialization and 
urbanization stagnated until the 1960s. At the beginning of the 1970s the 
plans for the two traffic networks mentioned above were decided by the 
national government, and a few years later the city government made the 
Nagaoka New Town Plan (1974). It aimed at restructuring the westside 
area of Shinano River by the conjunction of a residential section, a college 
section and a distribution industry section. Such a plan obviously aimed at 
making a technopolis of the area. Accordingly, when the Ministry of Interna­
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) released the idea of a technopolis, the city 
government immediately snatched at it, and MITI responded to this. Thus 
the Nagaoka New Town Plan sideslipped into the Nagaoka Technopolis
4 For a more extended analysis of Nagaoka, see Syoji (1985).
URBAN PLANNING AND THE M-E REVOLUTION IN JAPAN 1059
Development Plan (1984), which forsaw its future as a “Shinanogawa 
techno-valley”. But the leading technological companies are scarcely located 
there now-a-days. Most businessmen did appreciate this plan, but some of 
the traditional companies were critical of it fearing that the plan would not 
help the development of the traditional industries. Trade unions (left wing) 
have praised and supported the previous mayor for his far-reaching intelli­
gence. There was hardly any opposition except from the communist party. 
Most citizens were indifferent to the plan.
These cases show the emergence of one of the big problems originated 
from the M-E Revolution: the production of new space. Ooita was fairly 
successful in solving it while Nagaoka has failed. Nevertheless both towns 
have experienced: 1) that city plans do depend on national plans, and 2) 
that opposition to them is fragmented or limited to small groups which 
practically have no viable alternatives to propose.
5. Urban Planning and Social Movements
As discussed above, in the 1980s many urban plans were made to meet 
the new needs originated by the M-E Revolution. These plans, without 
exception, depicted the city future with rose colours: “an intelligent city”, 
“a campus city”, “a techno-valley”, etc. However, they do not necessarily 
promise to solve such problems as that of the sudden rise of land prices in 
Tokyo zones, urban and pollution problems in many cities, and so on. 
Rather, they mask such problems. This is, maybe, their only function. They 
basically represent the interest of big companies, multinational companies 
and the national government. Nevertheless, we cannot deny the importance 
of the M-E Revolution. It is a great factor of development in our post-indus­
trial society. Urban planning under the M-E Revolution must contribute to 
the citizens’ quality of life and social movements must ask for and encourage 
such planning.There are social movements which aim at opposing the construction of 
roads as well as certain redevelopment works, and denounce the insufficien­
cy of social investment in Tokyo and Kawasaki City. The anti-pollution 
movement in Kawasaki City is very strong. But now-a-days these actions 
and movements are not as strong as ten years ago, and are divided into 
many clusters, not integrated in one or a few groups. This is their weakness 
in that they are not strong enough to oppose urban planning totally or to 
propose alternatives to it. Why have they changed like this? Is this a 
characteristic of the post-industrial society or of the Japanese society?
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Surely the Japanese have enjoyed the “prosperity” produced by the M-E 
Revolution and have been ruled by a strong national government. Given 
these conditions, social movements decline and a new conservatism prevails. 
But, under different conditions, a common phenomenon is found in many 
advanced societies. This seems therefore a common feature of post-industrial 
societies. The problem is that a different strategy or a new alternative is 
still to be found.
Once Castells (1977) insisted on the importance of urban social move­
ments which can oppose urban planning as a political intervention to reorga­
nize the urban system. About ten years later, he changed his theory from 
marxian structuralism to a position close to A. Touraine, and explored the 
structure and meaning of the contemporary urban social movement as a 
reactive Utopia (Castells, 1983, p. 328). Now-a-days he is searching for the 
relationship between social movements and the “space of flows” (Castells, 
1985). However, in his theory the opposition to urban planning is gradually 
neglected.
Recently, criticizing Castells’ approach, Gottdiener (1985) has insisted 
on the concept of the environmental movement which specifies the nature of 
interventions in space transformation. He throws a new light on the actions 
of “advocacy planners”, on the resistance to renewal and redevelopment, 
and so on. But the active spheres of this movement are limited and his 
insistence is insufficient as a new strategy. Finding a new strategy for our 
post-industrial or post-fordism society is a challenge for the future.
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PIANIFICAZIONE URBANISTICA E RIVOLUZIONE MICROELETTRO- 
NICA IN GIAPPONE
Dalla metà degli anni 1970 in poi il capitalismo giapponese è stato influenza­
to dalla rivoluzione microelettronica e negli anni 1980 molti pianificatori urbani­
stici hanno dovuto affrontare i problemi che ne sono seguiti. Questo articolo 
cerca di analizzare tre casi tipici: Tokyo come città internazionale, Kawasaki 
come città con industrie ad alta tecnologia, Ooita e Nagaoka come tecnopoli.
I pianificatori urbanistici di queste aree hanno dipinto di rosa il futuro delle 
città. Tuttavia essi hanno mascherato molti problemi urbanistici che esistevano 
ed esistono tuttora.
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Scopo del presente saggio è quello di avanzare alcune considerazioni 
sullo sviluppo industriale del settore automobilistico, con particolare riferi­
mento al ruolo che il governo ha rivestito in questo contesto in due paesi 
asiatici: il Giappone e la Corea del Sud. Si tratta di due casi che pur 
presentando forti analogie e alcune marcate differenze nelle rispettive dina­
miche di sviluppo, si configurano come esempi di “successo”: il Giappone è 
oggi il principale produttore mondiale di autoveicoli mentre la Corea del
Tabella 1
PRODUZIONE TOTALE DI AUTOVEICOLI NEI PRINCIPALI PAESI
anni 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988/89
Giappone 481551 1875614 5289157 6941591 11042884 12271095 13025741 *Stati Uniti 7905119 11137830 8283949 8986513 8009841 11652743 11190432Germania
Occid. 2055149 2976477 3842247 3186208 3878553 4445920 4625314Inghilterra 1810700 2177261 2098498 1648399 1312914 1313946 1544848Francia 1369210 1641696 2750086 3299620 3378433 3016106 3698465Italia 644633 1175548 1854252 1458629 1610287 1572907 2111019
Corea 28819 37279 123135 378162 1129470*Brasile 133041 185187 416089 930235 1165174 966708 1068754
Fonte: J ama (1989c, 1990); Kaica (1990). 
* 1989.
* Università degli Studi di Milano, Istituto di Economia, Milano.
Paper presentato al Fourth Italy-Japan Workshop, Università di Siena, 20-21 settembre 1991.
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Sud ha assunto nell arco di pochi anni il ruolo di maggior esportatore fra le 
Economie di Nuova Industrializzazione (NIEs) impegnate nella produzione 
di auto.
In entrambi i paesi, la programmazione economica elaborata dal gover­
no e realizzata attraverso misure intese a stimolare, favorire e proteggere il 
settore, ha costituito la base essenziale della crescita. Nel caso del Giappone, 
come in quello della Corea, la fondazione di un’industria automobilistica 
nazionale non è stato il risultato di forze spontanee. Misure di diversa 
natura hanno permesso all’industria automobilistica di crescere sul mercato 
interno e rafforzarsi senza che un’indesiderata concorrenza di produttori 
esteri ne compromettesse lo sviluppo. Un successivo sbocco sui mercati 
esteri (la liberalizzazione del mercato interno è stata molto piu lenta e 
graduale) ha contribuito al rafforzamento della competitività e quindi dell’ef­
ficienza e della qualità del prodotto.
Elemento centrale di questa discussione è quindi la strategia adottata 
dal governo nel processo di sviluppo e la politica industriale perseguita che 
ha portato alla crescita del sistema-auto. L’analisi verrà affrontata facendo 
particolare riferimento alle politiche adottate nei confronti dell’acquisizione 
di tecnologia.
Le analogie e i legami fra le industrie automobilistiche nei due paesi, 
messi in luce dall’indagine, costituiscono un’occasione per analizzare il ruolo 
che il Giappone svolge in qualità di modello e partner nei confronti della 
Corea. La Corea ha in buona parte seguito l’esempio fornito pochi decenni 
prima dal Giappone, anche se le differenze esistenti fra le due economie 
hanno fatto si che per rispondere alle esigenze locali la strategia di crescita 
coreana risulti essere molto diversa da quella giapponese nel suo complesso. 
In particolar modo, per ciò che attiene il settore dell’auto, la Corea si è 
ispirata molto alla strategia giapponese, in particolare per la legislazione 
volta ad organizzare la produzione, per il sistema produttivo adottato, ecc.
In Giappone e in Corea la politica economica a sostegno dell’industria, 
insieme alle forme di protezionismo a tutela della infant industry hanno 
senz altro sortito esiti positivi. Tali misure, accettabili unicamente in una 
fase iniziale, hanno contribuito a creare basi piu o meno salde di sviluppo. 
Solo a questo prezzo i costi sostenuti, non solo a livello di sussidi ma anche 
nei confronti del consumatore, sono giustificabili. Nel considerare \& perform­
ance delle industrie automobilistiche nei due paesi, diviene possibile, sep­
pur in modo parziale, identificare alcuni dei limiti dell’azione politica stessa. 
Limiti di applicabilità di analoghe misure in contesti economici diversi, con 
un grado di sviluppo economico diverso. Scaturiscono da qui alcune contrad­
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dizioni ancora da superare, oggetto della discussione dei prossimi paragrafi.
«
Politica economica e sviluppo in Corea: i Piani Quinquennali
È a partire dal 1963, con l’inaugurazione del primo piano economico 
quinquennale, che lo sviluppo economico della Corea è stato regolato perse­
guendo precisi obiettivi identificati di volta in volta dal governo. Una 
analisi dei piani quinquennali e l’andamento reale dell’economia permettono 
di seguire la strategia di sviluppo adottata e i risultati conseguiti.
La Tab. 2 presenta uno schema sintetico dei sei piani varati fino ad 
oggi, con i settori economici designati come settori-chiave al fine dello 
sviluppo e al cui potenziamento erano finalizzate le principali politiche eco­
nomiche, le ragioni sottostanti a tali scelte e la performance in termini di 
crescita economica reale.
La crescita dell’economia coreana è stata caratterizzata da una prima 
fase basata su un’industrializzazione pesante import-substituting accompagna­
ta da una di tipo labour-intensive mediante il potenziamento di alcuni settori 
più tradizionali (tessile) (I-III Piano) cui si è aggiunto il settore dell’elettro­
nica di consumo, ed una seconda fase in cui si realizza il passaggio verso 
un’industria pesante a più elevato contenuto tecnologico (IV-VI Piano).
Nella prima fase, l’incoraggiamento della produzione in settori labour- 
intensive permetteva di impiegare l’unica risorsa veramente abbondante in 
Corea: il lavoro. Non rendendosi necessario un elevato contenuto di capitali 
e tecnologia fu facilitata la ripresa dell’attività economica. Essendo il paese 
ancora in condizioni di povertà, ed il mercato interno non in grado di 
sostenere la crescita di tali industrie, la maggior parte della produzione 
venne indirizzata all’estero. L’esportazione costituiva un modo per procurar­
si valuta estera che consentisse l’acquisto delle materie prime e della tecnolo­
gia necessaria a sostenere le fasi successive dell’industrializzazione. Allo 
scopo di migliorare la qualità del prodotto introducendo sistemi di produzio­
ne semplici ma più efficienti, ed allo scopo di finanziare ulteriori investimen­
ti, vennero varate diverse misure volte ad incoraggiare gli investimenti esteri 
e l’afflusso di capitali. La liberalizzazione riguardava solo i settori identificati 
dal governo, £ i progetti erano soggetti alla condizione che la produzione 
fosse volta esclusivamente ai mercati esteri. L’introduzione di capitali sotto 
forma di investimenti era anche resa necessaria dall’esigenza di sostituire 
gradualmente i flussi finanziari a titolo di aiuto, dei quali la Corea aveva 
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ridursi. Inoltre, il peso degli interessi sui prestiti era un problema che 
l’economia si sarebbe trovata ad affrontare entro breve tempo.
Come ai piani quinquennali si accompagnassero misure di politica eco­
nomica coerenti a perseguire gli obiettivi stabiliti, risulta evidente da un 
confronto fra la Fig. 1 e le Tabb. 3 e 4 illustranti rispettivamente la legisla­
zione volta a regolare gli afflussi di investimenti esteri e l’introduzione di 
tecnologia.
Per dirigere e coordinare queste politiche, e adottare anche misure 
drastiche era necessario un governo forte, e sebbene la situazione politica 
della Corea sia stata, ed è tuttora piuttosto instabile, la politica nei confronti 
dello sviluppo economico, si è rivelata coerente \
Protezione del mercato interno, rigida regolamentazione delle importa­
zioni, incentivi alle esportazioni sono state le principali misure adottate. Una 
graduale liberalizzazione è stata tuttavia iniziata a partire dagli anni 1970 
limitatamente ad alcuni settori. La crescita non è stata naturalmente costante 
e regolare, ma caratterizzata da momenti di espansione alternati ad acute 
crisi.
È a partire dal 1977 (IV Piano Quinquennale) che l’industria pesante 
assume ruolo di primo piano nella programmazione. Acciaio, cantieristica e 
semiconduttori affiancano l’elettronica di consumo, e principale obiettivo 
diviene il passaggio verso un tipo di produzione a più alto contenuto tecnolo­
gico, da esportare nei paesi avanzati. È in questo contesto che dopo il 
tentativo di sviluppare il settore cantieristico, il cui successo è stato compro­
messo dalle due crisi petrolifere, si inserisce la strategia per lo sviluppo 
dell’industria automobilistica.
Obiettivo designato del V e VI Piano Quinquennale, l’industria auto­
mobilistica è divenuta il settore che dovrebbe testimoniare il grado di svilup­
po raggiunto dal paese. Per la complessità e l’alto grado di organizzazione 
economica che la produzione automobilistica richiese (qualità dei prodotti 
intermedi e coordinamento fra industrie di moltissimi settori-base quali pla­
stica e vetro oltre che acciaio ed elettronica) l’auto è in genere un prodotto
1 Rinunciando ad affrontare il complesso dibattito inerente la forma di governo ottimale ai 
fini dello sviluppo economico è tuttavia da rilevare che spesso l’introduzione di misure atte alla 
creazione di infrastrutture risulta controversa, imponendo degli elevati costi a breve per 
costituire una base di sviluppo a lungo termine. A questo proposito, per esempio, è da rilevare 
l’enfasi che il governo coreano ha sempre posto sull’istruzione, sia favorendo la formazione di 
tecnici e specialisti all’estero sia enfatizzando l’importanza di elevare il grado di alfabetizzazione 
in tutti gli strati della popolazione, e questo insieme con misure molto drastiche nei confronti 
delle industrie per indurle a rispettare i target di sviluppo imposti dai piani economici.
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Tabella 3
POLITICHE VERSO GLI INVESTIMENTI ESTERI IN COREA
1960 Foreign Capital Inducement Act (FCIA)
Prima base legale per l’introduzione di capitali esteri. Vari tipi di agevolazioni (reimpatria- 
zione dei profitti per un massimo del 20% annuo, riduzione delle tasse, agevolazioni per 
la promozione di trasferimenti di tecnologia). Richiesto un minimo del 25% di partecipa­
zione locale.
1966 Foreign Capital Inducement Law
Revisione in forma estensiva della precedente regolamentazione. Le imprese straniere 
vennero totalmente esentate da qualsiasi forma di imposizione per i primi cinque anni di 
attività, mentre una riduzione del 50% venne concessa per i successivi tre anni.
1967 Comprehensive Measure of Rationalization of Foreign Capital Inflow
Con essa venne realizzato il passaggio a una politica maggiormente favorevole agli 
investimenti e volta a ridurre i prestiti. Nonostante questa legge fosse sostanzialmente 
diretta a regolamentare il flusso di capitali in forma di prestito, rappresentò il primo 
tentativo di regolare il flusso qualitativo degli investimenti.
1969 Measure to Promote thè Inflow of Direct Foreign Investment and to Foster thè Activities of 
Foreign Sub sidie s
Miglioramento del sistema di supporto agli investimenti esteri.
1970 Creazione della prima Free Export Zone (Masan)
1973 General Guidelines (Economie Planning Board)
Stabilivano i criteri per l’accettabilità dei progetti di investimento, limiti alla partecipazio­
ne estera (50%), scala minima degli investimenti (50.000 US$ e 500.000 US$ a partire 
dal 1975). Nelle Free Export Zones le aziende straniere non erano tuttavia soggette a 
molte di queste limitazioni.
1983 Foreign Capital Inducement Promotion Act (effettivo dal 1984)
Introduzione di un sistema automatico di accettazione dei progetti di investimento. 
Passaggio da una “negative list” a una “positive list” ovvero, tutti i progetti venivano 
approvati ad eccezione di quelli riguardanti specifici settori non ancora liberalizzati. I 
progetti relativi ad investimenti con una partecipazione estera inferiore al 50% venivano 
approvati automaticamente mentre gli altri erano soggetti a verifica. La negative list 
comprendeva 297 industrie su un totale di 997 (Korean Standard Industriai Classifica- 
tion), fra cui la lavorazione del ginseng, media, beni di lusso, progetti implicanti un uso 
estensivo della terra ecc.
1989 Liberalization of thè Investment in thè Automobile and Airplane Industry
1990 Revision of thè Automatic Approvai System
Aumento del capitale di investimento soggetto ad approvazione automatica. Eliminazione 
di alcune agevolazioni concesse agli investitori esteri dalla FCIA del 1960. Il tasso di 
liberalizzazione raggiunse il 79,1% (97,7% nel settore manifatturiero). Nella negative list 
figurano ancora i servizi, le assicurazioni, la pubblicità e la finanza.
Fonte: H ong S.T. (1990); H ong S.W. and Yim C.H. (1990); Sano (1980).
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Tabella 4
POLITICHE RELATIVE ALL’IMPORTAZIONE DI TECNOLOGIA IN COREA
Anno Contenuto della liberalizzazione Settori industriali interessati
1978/4 Sistema di approvazione 
Minimo investimento 30.000 US$
3% fixed rate (3 anni)
Invest. Fisso Totale entro 100.000 US$
Macchinari, Chimica, Tessile, Elettrico, 
Metalli non ferrosi, Elettronica
1979/4 Minimo investimento 500.000 US$ 
10% fixed rate (10 anni)
Energia atomica e tutte le industrie ad 
eccezione della difesa
1980/7 10% fixed rate (10 anni) Tutti i settori
1982/9 Valutazione per ogni singolo progetto Tutti i settori
1984/7 Passaggio dal sistema di approvazione a 
quello di notifica
Tutti i settori
1986/7 Introduzione dei diritti di marchio Tutti i settori
1988/7 Notifica dei progetti alla Foreign Ex­
change Service Bank 
Minimo investimento 50.000 US$
2% fixed rate (3 anni)
Invest. Fisso Totale entro 100.000 US$
Tutti i settori
Fonte: Ahn (1990); Chung (1986); Kim (1984).
delle economie mature. Di rilievo quindi il caso della Corea che, grazie ad 
una efficace politica economica e molti sforzi, è riuscita in cosi breve tempo 
ad esportare auto sui mercati internazionali. Tuttavia, problemi connessi al 
costo del lavoro, instabilità interna e vulnerabilità alle fluttuazioni internazio­
nali minano ancora la sua crescita.
Lo sviluppo dell'industria automobilistica in Corea e Giappone
Le industrie impegnate nella produzione di autoveicoli in Corea sono 
attualmente quattro: Hyundai Motors, Daewoo Motors, Ssangyong e Kia 
Motors. Hyundai Motors, l’ultima ad essere stata fondata, cronologicamente, 
è la piu grande e potente casa costruttrice. Tutte e quattro le aziende sono 
annoverate fra le dieci maggiori imprese del Paese 2. Kia, che vanta la più 
lunga tradizione, è la sola ad essere esclusivamente specializzata in auto e
2 Toyo Keizai N ipposha (1990).
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componenti, mentre le altre fanno tutte parte dei cosiddetti chaebol3 4la cui 
attività economica è in genere molto diversificata.
Nel 1989 la Hyundai Motors contribuiva alla produzione automobilisti­
ca nazionale con il 54,4%, coprendo per il 71% il mercato interno delle 
automobili insieme a Kia (28%), Daewoo Motors (14,3%) e Ssangyong 
(3 ,3% )\
La situazione produttiva del Giappone è piu nota: undici sono le case 
produttrici, anche se il numero si riduce a nove se consideriamo Nissan 
Diesel come parte di Nissan e Daihatsu come Toyota. Toyota e Nissan 
rimangono dai tempi della loro fondazione (rispettivamente nel 1937 e nel 
1934) le grandi protagoniste, producendo rispettivamente il 30,5% ed il 
18,2% della produzione nazionale 5. Simili le dimensioni produttive di Hon­
da (11%), Mitsubishi (10%) e Isuzu (10%), anche se il loro peso cambia 
se l’analisi viene calata in ambito internazionale 6.
Una caratteristica che accomuna le industrie dei due paesi è quella di 
avere un elevato numero di case produttrici, soprattutto se si considerano i 
paesi occidentali, dove il carattere oligopolistico della produzione è più 
accentuato, sfiorando in alcuni casi addirittura il monopolio. Mentre in 
Europa la vicinanza e la relativa integrazione dei mercati ha fatto si che la 
concorrenza si svolgesse in ambito europeo fra i pochi produttori nazionali, 
in Giappone e in Corea una prolungata protezione del mercato interno e una 
specifica regolamentazione del settore hanno favorito la creazione di una 
concorrenza “pilotata” (verso una maggiore efficienza produttiva) che si è 
svolta unicamente fra aziende nazionali.
Politica economica ed industria automobilistica
L’industria automobilistica coreana ha origini abbastanza recenti. La 
sua storia può essere fatta iniziare con la fondazione della Senara Co. nel 
1962 la prima industria per l’assemblaggio di Semi Knocked Down (SKD) 
importati da Stati Uniti e Giappone. Da allora, la sua crescita è stata notevo­
le: alla fine del decennio tutte le imprese per la produzione di veicoli
3 Gruppi finanziari la cui struttura viene spesso assimilata agli zaibatsu giapponesi dell’an­
teguerra. Vedi: Steers, Shin , Ungson (1989).
4 Rama (1990b).
3 Jama (1990).
6 Honda infatti è sempre stata più attiva sui mercati esteri di quanto lo sia sul territorio 
nazionale.
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tutt’ora esistenti erano state fondate 7, e realizzato il passaggio dall’assem- 
blaggio di SKD a Completely Knocked Down (CKD).
Se confrontata con la storia del Giappone, la differenza è stridente, 
almeno se si considera l’arco temporale relativo al decollo della produzione. 
In Giappone, le basi per la produzione di veicoli risalgono all’inizio del 
secolo. Fino alla fine del secondo conflitto mondiale l’industria fu sostenuta 
dall’esercito e la produzione esclusivamente incentrata su veicoli pesanti, 
camion e vetture indirizzate a scopi bellici. Questa prima fase riveste un’im­
portanza notevole per il Giappone, in quanto gli consenti di organizzare il 
sistema di produzione sia mediante un graduale miglioramento della qualità 
dei prodotti intermedi, sia a livello di coordinamento delle diverse produzio­
ni concorrenti alla fabbricazione del prodotto-auto. Paradossalmente, fino 
agli inizi degli anni ’70, il principale problema dell’industria automobilistica 
giapponese era la qualità del prodotto, ben inferiore a quello occidentale. I 
primi tentativi di esportazione fallirono infatti miseramente 8. Incessanti
Fig. 1. Produzione di Autoveicoli in Corea, 1962-1989 
(Milioni di Veicoli)
Fonte: (elab. su) Kaica (1990)
7 Kia Motors, Asia Motors (successivamente divenuta parte di Kia), Hyundai Motors 
furono fondate rispettivamente nel 1962, 1965 e 1967. La Ssangyong Motor (ex Ha Dong- 
Whan e T’ong-A), fondata nel 1955, produceva in origine esclusivamente per l’esercito. Dal 
1986 ha assunto la forma attuale (Vedi Kato e Kubota, 1990).
8 Questo fu l’esito del tentativo fatto dalla Toyota nel 1957 di penetrare il mercato 
americano. Nei sei anni che succedettero, la Toyota si impegnò a fondo in programmi di ricerca 
per lo sviluppo di un nuovo modello di auto che potesse soddisfare la domanda americana.
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Fig . 2. Produzione Totale di Autoveicoli in Giappone, 1960-1989 
(Milioni di Veicoli)
Fonte: (elab. su) Jama (1989a, 1990)
sforzi, insieme ad importazioni ed investimenti in tecnologia hanno portato 
il Giappone ad essere negli anni ’80 il più efficiente produttore di auto.
Alcuni grafici illustranti l’andamento delle principali dinamiche della 
crescita dell’industria automobilistica nei due paesi, aiutano a completare il 
quadro.
La crescita della produzione di veicoli giapponesi è cresciuta in modo 
stabile sin dagli anni ’60. Le uniche flessioni registrate sono state in corri­
spondenza degli oil shocks, ai quali tuttavia il Giappone ha reagito molto 
positivamente. La variazione delle caratteristiche della domanda internazio­
nale di auto a seguito di tali crisi è stata alla base della performance interna­
zionale delle auto giapponesi: piccole, maneggevoli, con un minor consumo 
energetico.
Per quanto riguarda invece la Corea, il ritmo di incremento è stato più 
lento e ha registrato alcune flessioni, di cui la più grave nel 1980 a seguito 
della difficile situazione politica interna 9. A seguito delle misure di sostegno 
varate dal governo volte a stimolare la produzione del “national car” si 
verificò poi una brusca accelerazione. Agevolazioni agli investimenti aveva­
no infatti indotto Hyundai e Kia a creare nuovi impianti, potenziando la 
produzione. Se congiuntamente alla produzione si considera l’andamento
9 A seguito dell’assassinio del presidente Park Chung Hee.
l ’in d u s t r ia  a u t o m o b il is t ic a  g ia p p o n e s e  e  c o r e a n a 1073
delle esportazioni si nota come a partire dal 1985, ovvero con l’inizio delle 
esportazioni sul mercato nordamericano, l’aumento della produzione sia es­
senzialmente trainato da esse. La strategia economica di sviluppo coreano 
incentrato sulle esportazioni risulta quindi evidente anche nella performance 
delle esportazioni del settore automobilistico. Nel 1987 le esportazioni rap­
presentarono il 55,7% della produzione, il 53,2% l’anno successivo. Questa 
espansione non è stata duratura, e forse piu legata ad una favorevole con­
giuntura internazionale che ad una base reale di competitività 10. Il 1989 ed 
il 1990 hanno infatti visto calare sensibilmente il flusso di esportazioni 
anche a seguito di misure anti-dumping adottate dal governo canadese. An­
che se questo calo è stato compensato da un ampliamento del mercato 
interno, l’industria automobilistica coreana non ha ancora basi sufficiente- 
mente ampie per affermarsi saldamente sui mercati dei paesi avanzati.
Fig. 3. Corea -  Produzione ed Esportazione di Autoveicoli, 1975-1989 
(Milioni di Veicoli)
Produzione — Esportazione
Fonte: come Fig. 1.
10 Questi anni vengono definiti dagli economisti coreani come il periodo dei three lows, 
identificando in un favorevole tasso di cambio con il dollaro (e dollaro/Yen), nella riduzione 
del prezzo del petrolio e nell’abbassamento dei tassi di interesse sul debito internazionale i 
principali fattori che hanno influito positivamente sulla crescita dell’economia coreana (vedi: 
Song, 1990).
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Da un confronto di indicatori quali il livello di produzione, esportazio­
ni, il raggiungimento della “produzione di massa” 11 ed il livello di locai 
content conseguito, risulta che fra lo sviluppo delle industrie nei due paesi vi 
è un intervallo temporale di circa venti anni (il livello della produzione 
coreana eguaglia quella giapponese degli anni ’60); lo stesso divario separa a 
grandi linee il grado di sviluppo economico generale 12 *. L’industria automobi­
listica coreana, smentendo questo approccio deterministico, ha tuttavia rag­
giunto una capacità produttiva pari a quella del Giappone degli anni ’70 in 
un lasso temporale di gran lunga inferiore. Ciò è stato reso possibile dalla 
accessibilità alla tecnologia unita ad un’elevata capacità di assorbimento 
della stessa (absorptive capacity u ); tuttavia, questa rapidità ha favorito il 
perpetuarsi di alcune inefficienze all’interno del processo produttivo ora 
difficili da superare.
Un’analisi delle principali misure di politica economica adottate nei 
confronti dell’industria automobilistica in Giappone e Corea consente di 
chiarire sia lo sviluppo che il presente assetto dell’industria automobilistica. 
Nell’iter della politica economica coreana è possibile ravvisare, in poco 
meno di un ventennio, tutte le principali misure già adottate dal Giappone 
alcuni decenni prima. Grazie all’import di tecnologia effettuato, ogni fase 
dello sviluppo (con i passaggi dall’assemblaggio di SDK a CKD al 99% 
di locai content) è stata realizzata in Corea nel giro di pochissimi anni. Oltre 
alle misure protezionistiche nei confronti delle importazioni di veicoli finiti e 
parti dall’estero 14, e sovvenzioni e condizioni privilegiate di vario genere, 
sono da evidenziare le politiche nei confronti dello sviluppo del “national 
car” (nel 1955 in Giappone e nel 1981 in Corea), ed il Measures for thè 
Integration of thè Motor Industry Act adottato prima in Giappone e solo 
molto più tardi in Corea. Con esso veniva identificato dal Governo il numero 
ideale di case produttrici che era inferiore a quello delle case esistenti ed ope­
ranti; venivano cosi auspicate fusioni allo scopo di raggiungere quella che 
veniva considerata essere una scala produttiva efficiente. Provvedimenti ana­
loghi riguardarono anche il tipo di produzione cui ogni azienda doveva 
dedicarsi. In tal senso negli anni compresi fra il 1980 e il 1986 la Kia
11 Identificata con il raggiungimento della capacità produttiva di un milione di unità.
12 Secondo stime di economisti coreani basate, fra l’altro, sul livello di reddito pro-capite 
si tratta di venti-venticinque anni (Song, 1990).
15 Questa capacità di assorbire e migliorare le tecnologie importate viene considerata da 
molti economisti come il principale fattore in grado di spiegare l’enorme crescita registrata in 
specifici settori economici. Questa ipotesi, già avanzata per il settore tessile-manifatturiero 
(Rhee-Larson, P ursell, 1984), è stata estesa a settori con più elevato contenuto tecnologico 
(vedi specialmente Kim, 1984 e Park, 1990).
14 Realizzate con il Protection System for thè Automobile Industry del 1962.
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Motors si specializzò nella produzione di veicoli commerciali, mentre impe­
gnate nella produzione di autoveicoli rimanevano la Hyundai Motors e la 
Daewoo Motors. Nel Giappone dell’anteguerra analoghe regolamentazioni 
erano state già imposte, e la produzione di veicoli era autorizzata esclusiva- 
mente a scopi bellici. Il fatto che tali politiche restrittive nei confronti 
dell’industria potessero venir adottate, trova spiegazione nel particolare rap­
porto esistente fra struttura governativa ed industria. Da carattere impositi­
vo, esso è gradualmente divenuto sempre piu collaborativo e consultivo. 
L’applicazione di tali misure non sarebbe più possibile nel Giappone odier­
no. Ancora diverso è il caso della Corea, dove le industrie sono ancora molto 
dipendenti in quanto a risorse finanziarie ed agevolazioni dal governo che 
gode ancora di una notevole influenza sulla gestione delle imprese. È indub­
bio che tale legame si affievolirà con la crescita economica e con la capacità 
delle industrie di autofinanziarsi. Da quanto emerso finora dalle misure di 
politica economica adottate nei confronti del settore automobilistico, risulta 
evidente come la Corea si sia ispirata al modello fornito dal Giappone nella 
speranza di riproporne il successo. Riuscendovi in buona parte. Tuttavia è al 
ritardo con il quale il governo coreano ha regolamentato l’organizzazione dei 
produttori di parti e componenti che si deve attribuire l’origine delle attuali 
difficoltà dell’industria automobilistica coreana. Le misure erano infatti diret­
te soprattutto a regolamentare l’attività degli assemblatori, trascurando lo 
sviluppo qualitativo e il coordinamento delle ancillary firms 15. Mentre in 
Giappone la normativa atta a fissare i criteri per la standardizzazione delle 
parti risale al 1938 16, in Corea bisogna attendere il 1986. Il governo corea­
no, al fine di accelerare la crescita della produzione di veicoli, la loro qualità 
e conseguente esportabilità, ha condotto una politica solo parziale nei con­
fronti delle parti e componenti, tollerandone l’importazione, in particolare 
dal Giappone. Ne è risultato un doppio ordine di problemi: favorire il 
perpetuarsi di una grave inefficienza nel sistema di organizzazione produtti­
va, e la creazione di una forte dipendenza dell’industria automobilistica 
coreana nei confronti di quella giapponese. In corrispondenza di un diminui­
to flusso di importazioni di veicoli finiti dal Giappone si è registrato un 
aumento nelle importazioni di parti e componenti 17. Vi è oggi in Corea un
15 Vedi: Shitagawa, Fujisawa e Kio (1986), e Odaka, O hno ed Adachi (1988) per un 
confronto con lo sviluppo del sistema giapponese.
16 Registration of Qualified Auto Parts and Materials.
17 Appurare l’entità dei flussi di parti e componenti in entrata e in uscita dal paese non è 
cosa semplice. I dati riportati da fonti governative coreane differiscono notevolmente a seconda 
dell’istituto od ente che ne cura la pubblicazione (Vedi: Kama, 1990a, Kaica, 1990). Non 
sussiste inoltre corrispondenza con i flussi di esportazioni dichiarate da fonti giapponesi
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doppio mercato di parti e componenti: quelle prodotte in Corea e assembla­
te su veicoli commercializzati aU’interno, e quelle importate e montate su 
veicoli destinati ai mercati esteri.
Per ciò che riguarda l’acquisizione di tecnologia nel settore automobili­
stico, Giappone e Corea rappresentano due casi atipici; seguendo una politi­
ca simile fra loro, hanno cercato di limitare ài massimo ogni tipo di collabo- 
razione estera che comportasse un coinvolgimento diretto del partner stranie­
ro nella produzione. Infatti, in particolare nel caso dell’industria automobili­
stica, la realizzazione di joint ventures fra paesi avanzati in cui la produzione 
di auto ha raggiunto uno stadio maturo, e paesi che intendono sviluppare 
una produzione nazionale di veicoli è un fenomeno molto frequente 1S. Alla 
protezione del mercato domestico dall’importazione di veicoli stranieri si è 
aggiunta una legislazione restrittiva nei confronti degli investimenti dall’este­
ro. Questa legislazione ha interessato il settore automobilistico fino al 1971 
in Giappone e fino al 1989 in Corea. Al fine di sviluppare l’industria 
automobilistica nazionale, Giappone e Corea hanno preferito acquisire la 
tecnologia necessaria attraverso forme cosiddette unbounded, ovvero tramite 
l’acquisto diretto di brevetti o tramite contratti di licensing. Fu infatti me­
diante contratti di licensing stipulati con una scadenza di 6-8 anni che il 
Giappone realizzò la conversione a scopi civili dell’industria, acquisendo la 
tecnologia necessaria a produrre autoveicoli * 189 invece di veicoli speciali, per 
la produzione dei quali la qualità aveva ormai raggiunto livelli soddisfacenti. 
Entro i termini di scadenza dei contratti le aziende giapponesi avevano 
acquisito la tecnologia necessaria a produrre i veicoli. A partire dal 1965, 
quando il 100% di locai content fu raggiunto, tutti gli sforzi si concentraro­
no sulla competitività, ovvero sui miglioramenti qualitativi necessari a guada­
gnare il mercato internazionale.
Anche la Corea ha privilegiato forme unbounded di acquisizione tecno­
logica 20 perseguendo la cosiddetta “goes it alone policy”, ma una base produt­
tiva ancora poco solida e la rapidità alla quale l’industria è stata indotta a 
crescere, (per finanziare il suo sviluppo), ha favorito la creazione di un 
legame di dipendenza dalle fonti di tecnologia. La Corea è divenuta oggi la 
principale importatrice di tecnologia giapponese 21 relativa al settore auto di 
tutta la regione asiatica, e pur avendo raggiunto il 99% di locai content (già
(Ministry of Transport). La componente di commercio inter-industriale (tra aziende giapponesi e
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nel 1976 il local content era del 96%) rimane ancora dipendente per la 
produzione e progettazione di alcune componenti22.
Il conseguimento del 100% di local content ed il contenimento del 
costo del lavoro sono i due principali problemi che l’industria automobilisti­
ca coreana deve risolvere per conseguire una reale base concorrenziale che 
senz’altro la vedrà presente in modo crescente anche sui mercati europei.
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POLITICAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOTOR IN­
DUSTRY IN JAPAN AND KOREA
This study tries to define the characteristics of the development of the 
motor industry in Japan and in Korea by considering the specific policies adopted 
by the government toward the sector. The government played in both countries 
an essential role in the industry’s growth and in many aspects the policy adopted 
has been very similar. Korea followed the example offered in earlier times by 
Japan, achieving a sectoral development unique among other NIEs auto producers, 
thanks to its capacity of adapting and absorbing imported technology. Still some 
problems undermine its competitiveness and have to be overcome to gain a real 
production efficiency. The links existing between Japan and Korea within the 
motor industry confirm the role Japan has in the Asian region as model and 
partner.
.
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 38 (1991), N. 12, 1081-1097
INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND AGRICULTURAL 
ORGANIZATION IN JAPAN
by
H ir o y u k i T akeya  *
This article is concerned with the impact of industrial restructuring on 
farming and employment in rural Japan. I wish to analyze, as an example, 
Toyota’s development of the automotive industry in the Aichi Prefecture. 
Aichi, with its established Japanese style production system, can be consid­
ered a typical prefecture.
1. Reasons for Choosing the Automobile Industry
Two points should be kept in mind before starting this analysis. The 
first concerns the Japanese automobile industry, and the importance of 
considering Toyota as typical of the industry. The development of the 
Japanese automobile industry began in the late 1950’s, and since then the 
automobile industry has assumed a leading role in the Japanese economy. 
In 1960, for example, the output of the automobile industry, in value terms, 
accounted for less than 5.2% of the total manufacturing output. By 1970, 
this percentage had increased to 7.8%, and by 1980 to 9.9%. In 1985 the 
figure had reached 11.9%. In terms of exports (FOB), motor vehicles 
accounted for 2.4% of exports in 1960, 9.7% of exports in 1970, and 
21.9% in 1980. By 1986, a full 25.6% of Japanese exports consisted 
of motor vehicles. Particularly impressive was the growth of exports from 
the 1970’s to the mid 1980’s. It is clear that the rapid growth of the 
Japanese economy has been dependent on the development of the automo­
bile industry.
Nagoya University, Faculty of Agriculture, Nagoya (Japan).
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Today, there are 10 enterprises that produce motor vehicles in Japan. 
Toyota Motor Co. is the largest \
In 1989 Toyota produced 3,980,000 units, thus accounting for 30% 
of Japanese production. Toyota’s domestic sales of new vehicles reached a 
record of 2,300,000 units, some 41% of the domestic market. These figures 
make Toyota Motor Co. the leading Japanese firm in the industry. The 
study of Toyota, therefore, will give us a key to the understanding of the 
features of the Japanese economy and its industrial restructuring.
The second point that must be considered before beginning this analy­
sis is the impact of the industrial structure on labor markets. In the last 13 
years, the Aichi prefecture, home to most of the Toyota factories, has led 
Japan in terms of value of manufacturing output. The Aichi prefecture has 
seen the vast development of both inland and coastal areas. There are now 
some 107 km1 2 of industrial areas, 25 km2 of which on coastal lands. The 
Toyota Motor Co. is located primarily in the Nishimikawa region 2. This 
region, before the period of “high economic growth”, had seen the devel­
opment of specialized textile manufacturing. These industries were located 
in six cities, and agriculture remained the main industry in the rural areas. 
In 1960, 33% of the labor force was employed in agriculture, and farm 
households accounted for 42% of the total population. Since that time, the 
pillar of employment in the region has shifted from the textile industry to 
the automotive industry. This switch towards the automotive industry was 
accelerated during and after the late 1970’s by the micro-electronics revolu­
tion (Figure 1). Between 1960 and 1986, the number of persons employed 
in manufacturing grew threefold, from 115,000 to 312,000. It should 
be remembered that the supply of labor from rural areas has been an 
indispensable component of high economic growth in Japan.
Industrialization brought an increase in the urbanization of the region. 
The inhabitants of the Nishimikawa region increased from 698,000 in 1960 
to 1,237,000 in 1985. This led to an expansion of the labor market in the 
wholesale, retail and service areas. Nevertheless, some 51% of the labor 
force is employed either for the automobile industry or for some automobile 
related industry.
Keeping in mind the conditions mentioned above, we can proceed in 
our study of the impact of industrial restructuring on agriculture and rural 
areas. In particular, we will try to understand the effects of the Toyota
1 According to a Wako Economic Institute Report, Toyota Motor Co. remained the largest 
Japanese enterprise in 1989. Asahi Shinbun, June 5, 1990.
2 The Toyota Motor Co. has concentrated most of its factories and subcontracting factories 
in the Nishimikawa region. H ikaru (1980, p. 193).
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Group and their subcontractors on agriculture and rural areas. I will address 
this question with respect to labor force, land use, capital formation, and 
the farming system.
2. Impact of the Automobile Industry on Labor and Employment in the 
Surrounding Rural Areas 3
The growth of automobile manufacturing quickly made this industry 
the pillar of the regional labor market. The rapidly growing demand for 
labor brought tremendous change to the surrounding rural areas, and the 
structure of work and employment began a radical transformation. The rural 
agricultural labor force moved quickly into non-agricultural industries. This 
shift from agricultural to non-agricultural employment occurred at different 
speeds in different areas, and did not occur in one fluid step. The entire 
process, rather, progressed through several stages.
1) The first stage involved an increase in temporary workers 4. In 
1956, as Toyota Motor Co. began large scale growth, it established a system 
of hiring temporary workers. After 1956, total employment began to in­
crease. In this period, the rural labor force was recruited in the form of 
temporary workers. In November of 1961, in fact, 5,099 of a total of 
11,963 employees were temporary workers.
2) The second stage falls between 1962, when Toyota began to hire 
high school graduates, and 1967, when the temporary workers policy was 
revised. In this stage, a number of temporary employees were to be pro­
moted to regular positions, called Minaraikou, one year after they were 
hired. The system of temporary workers had been seen as highly adjustable 
in terms of industrial reserves, but in the second stage it began to lose this 
quality. Seasonal workers, called Kisetsukou, were hired to cope with 
business fluctuations. At this point, the Toyota work force in 1967 was 
distributed as follows: Minaraikou 40% , seasonal workers 19%, high 
school graduates 28% , workers resigned from the Self-Defense forces 4%, 
workers trained by the company 3%, office workers 4% , and technicians 
2%.
The temporary and seasonal workers were supplied from the surround­
ing rural areas. Businesses began to bus workers from rural areas, and the
5 Surrounding rural areas are referred to as the areas from which employees are able to 
commute to the Toyota Group and subcontracting enterprises. Due to improvements in 
transportation and to the expansion of factories into rural areas, this area is expanding.
4 See Kiyoshi (1967, p. 228).
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Fig. 1. Employment in the Nishimikawa region by industry group, percentile breakdown.
Source: Census of Manufacturers, MITI, various years.
area from which they recruited labor began to grow. Thus, in the second 
stage, the area labor force was drawn out to work for Toyota and Toyota’s 
many subcontractors. Some of these workers were promoted from temporar- 
y to regular workers, either by Toyota or by the subcontractors. Others 
were employed as new commuting workers, and still others were hired on a 
seasonal basis These categories, in fact, determined a stratification of the 
labor force. This stratification formed the basis of differences in work condi­
tions, salaries, etc.
In other words, the first stage involved the formation of a wage cate­
gory (v) for rural labor. In this stage they were drawn out primarily as 
temporary workers. The second stage, in comparison, witnessed stratifica­
tion based on wages (V and v). This stratification resulted from differences 
between regular workers and seasonal or temporary employees. Further 
distinctions emerged as a function of whether an employee worked with the 
parent company or with a subcontractor.
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3) The third stage occurred between 1967, when the temporary work­
ers system was revised, and 1973, year of the oil crisis. In this stage, Toyota 
built factories one after the other to provide against liberalization of foreign 
capital. This period also saw an expansion of the subcontracting enterprises. 
The result was further demands on the area labor force.
Two methods were employed to increase the availability of labor. The 
first involved an expansion of the commuting labor force by way of improve­
ments in the rural road network. The second method consisted of attempts 
by the subcontracting industries to draw labor particularly from housewives 
or the elderly who were difficult to bring into the factories. Part of these 
programs involved the establishment of subcontractors, called Nayakoujo 
(shed factory). These included both family operated businesses and small 
businesses that depended on a small number of employees.
Thus in addition to the increased extraction of labor from the country­
side in the form of commuters, the third stage involved the establishment of 
branch factories in rural areas to employ middle age and elderly individuals. 
Some rural households themselves became subcontractors. This gave the 
subcontract structure a pyramid-like, stratified design. This pyramid-like 
structure was also seen in terms of the labor force, with the rural labor 
force consisting of the bottom tier. These developments also brought an 
increased stratification in the wage structure, as well as in the opposition 
between labor and capital5.
4) The expansion of the industry reached a turning point with the 
onset of the oil crisis. Toyota sharply reduced the number of seasonal and 
temporary workers employed. Workers, mainly high school graduates, were 
hired only in numbers that allowed for the replacement of retirees. Subcon­
tractors were thinned out on the basis of lower parts prices, and the Kanban 
system was forced to introduce even lower level subcontractors. It was in 
this fourth stage that the restructuring of Toyota and its subcontractors 
began.
These changes had a profound impact on the regional labor market: 
the employees became reluctant to change their job; subcontractors typically 
either shut down, or they increased investments in machinery and e-
! The Toyota automobile industry is divided into a pyramid-like structure, including 
subcontractors, with the Toyota Motor Co. at the top. The second strata is composed of 168 
firms, mostly subcontractors. The third strata consists of 4,700 secondary subcontractors; the 
fourth level consists of some 31,600 companies. Further levels of subcontractors make up the 
bottom levels of this pyramid. Toyota Motor Co. keeps records on the first, second and third 
levels of subcontractors, but not of those below the fourth. Department of Small or 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (1978, pp. 168-9).
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quipment and reorganized the wage scale to meet falling parts prices. In 
short, this means bipolarization, i.e. differentiation. Thus, the Toyota Group 
moved to increase efficiency and lower production costs through a revision 
of its subcontracting system and a reorganization of its labor market. This 
led to an expansion of both its domestic and export sales after the oil crisis. 
By 1980, production had reached 3 million units, two times 1970 produc­
tion.
5) In 1981, production fell for the first time. The automobile industry 
had reached a new turning point. The domestic market had neared satura­
tion, and exports, because of the growing trade imbalance, became subject 
to voluntary export restrictions.
The fifth stage, in the 1980’s, saw the creation of a system in which 
the wants of the consumer were dealt with directly. The amalgamation of 
Toyota Jiko Co. (responsible for the production of motor vehicles) and
Fig. 2. Ratio of cash earnings per worker by size of enterprise to cash earnings per worker of 
enterprises with 1000 or more workers, transport equipment industry (Aichi prefecture).
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Source: Census of Manufacturers, MITI, various years.
INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION 1087
Toyota Jihan Co. (responsible for sales of motor vehicles) dates back to this 
period. This new system was aided by the micro-electronics revolution, 
which made it possible to implement a flexible manufacturing system that 
allowed for the production of a variety of vehicles in small quantities. At the 
same time, the production of automobiles overseas was increased. By 1986, 
for example, the Toyota Motor Co. was involved in the manufacturing and 
assembly of automobiles in 17 countries. Subcontracting enterprises fol­
lowed the lead of their parent companies and also made their way into 
foreign countries. This period witnessed the creation of an international 
subcontracting system.
Domestic subcontractors will be forced to make changes in response to 
the increased role of overseas subcontractors. More flexibility in production 
and lower operating costs will be required. This will entail changes in the 
employment structure, including modifications of the seniority wage system 
and the system of lifelong employment (Fig. 2).
3. Systems and Mechanism with which Labor Is Drawn from the Countryside
1) Earlier we examined the conditions which led to the extraction of 
surplus labor from the countryside. As their employment situation changed, 
many farming households saw themselves transformed into part time farm­
ers. Many became what are known as type II farmers; farmers who earn 
most of their income from other jobs. In 1950, 52% of all farming house­
holds in Toyota city worked their farms full time. Type II farmers ac­
counted for only 23% of the farming households. In 1985, the number of 
farming families that worked the land full time fell to 5% , while the type II 
farming families rose to 88%. The total number of farm households fell to 
33% between 1960 and 1985. One can see that the rural labor force, as it 
has come to pivot on the automobile industry, has been drastically reor­
ganized.
On account of the difficulties involved in harnessing the rural labor 
force (difficulties such as commuting, etc.), two labor markets have e- 
merged. One exists in the urbanized areas. This involves the need for labor 
to cummute from more rural areas. A second market for labor exists in the 
rural areas themselves. While the more urban markets typically involve 
younger workers, the rural market for labor often involves housewives and 
middle age or elderly people. In terms of the enterprises themselves, the 
more urban enterprises are generally located within the upper strata of 
businesses, while the more rural enterprises are found in lower positions.
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Fig. 3-1. Relationship between age and annual income of male workers in Tsukude village, by 
industry (1977).
[»9 «)
Source: Material at Tsukude village office. Basic Survey on Wage Structure in Aichi 
Prefecture, Ministry of Labour (1977).
Note: Solid line represents average annual income of male employed in machinery and 
equipment manufacturing (Aichi prefecture).
2) Figure 3 shows the characteristics of wages by age of workers in 
the Tsukude village, considered a marginal area for commuting. The solid 
line drawn through the middle of the graph indicates the average annual 
income of a worker engaged in machinery or equipment manufacturing in 
the Aichi prefecture. This convex line reaches its peak when workers are 50 
to 55 years old. This line has the same shape as an analogous line for 
workers involved in the manufacturing of motor vehicles in Tsukude village.
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Note: Solid line represents average annual income of females employed in machinery and 
equipment manufacturing (Aichi prefecture).
The wages of middle age and elderly employees in Tsukude village, 
however, were lower than the average wages for the Aichi prefecture. Many 
employees had salaries 50 or 60% below the average. On the other hand, 
the wage disparities for the 18 to 35 year old age group is not so large. This 
discrepancy between wage differentials dependent upon age group is called 
wage disparity between generations 6.
If we compare wages across industry type, the annual income of males
6 Similar analysis of wage disparities were done by U s a m i  (1982, pp. 47-56) in the 
Thohoku region and by Syoji (1986, pp. 389-407, 469-472) in the Tokai region.
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Fig. 3-3. Relationship between age and annual income of male workers in Tsukude village, by 
industry (1985)
Source: Takeya (1988).
Basic Survey on Wage Structure in Aichi Prefecture, ML (1986)
Note: Solid line represents average annual income of males employed in transport 
equipment manufacturing (Aichi prefecture).
engaged in the production of transportation equipment was inflated by the 
wages in construction and in textiles manufacturing. For housewives and 
middle age or elderly workers, whose supply of labor exceeds demand, the 
wages in the manufacturing of motor vehicles was consistently depressed by 
the wages paid for their labor in construction and in textiles manufacturing (Fig. 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4).
As mentioned above, wages in the Toyota Group and subcontracting
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Note: Solid line represents average annual income of females employed in transport 
equipment manufacturing (Aichi prefecture).
enterprises correspond to a division of these enterprises into many strata. 
Wages at the larger, upper level enterprises are high, while wages at 
smaller, lower level firms tend to be low. This disparity in wages among 
enterprises is just as evident as the wage disparity between urban and’ rural 
areas. The commuting, urban labor market typically involves big enterprises, 
while the market for labor in rural and marginal areas typically involves 
smaller, lower level firms.
So we see that in addition to the wage disparity between generations, 
there exists a wage disparity between rural and urban areas. Wages in rural 
areas are kept low by the even lower wages in textiles and construction, and 
these industries also serve as pools from which to draw labor. Therefore 
disparities in employment and wages between different areas continue to 
exist in a stratified labor market.
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4. Farm Household Members Employed in Many Jobs and the Spread of the 
Use of Urbanized Farmland as Property 7
1) We have seen that the growth of the Toyota Co. and its subcontrac­
tors has formed a vast labor market. In other words, the employment 
opportunities of the rural labor forces have increased dramatically in spite 
of the wage differentials mentioned above. In Tsukude farming families, 
for example, 60% of males and 37% of females over the age of 16 were 
employed (based on 1985 Census of Agriculture figures). In the average 
farming household, 1.03 males were employed along with .67 females; for 
an average total of 1.70 employees per farming family.
If we add to this figure the number of family members who work on 
the farm or in other activities we obtain the average total number of em­
ployed people per farm household. In Toyota city, an average of 3.32 out 
of 5.12 (65%) members of farm families were employed in 1985 (64% in 
1980). In Shimoyama village the figure was 70%, 3.12 workers out of 
4.47 members (68% in 1980). In Tsukude village, 3.06 out of 4.26 fa m ily 
members worked, for a total of 72% (68% in 1980). The national average 
for non-agricultural households was 1.56 employees out of 3.71 family 
members for a total of only 42% (41% in 1980). It is thus evident that 
the rate of workers per household was higher for agricultural than for 
non-agricultural households. This, despite the fact that housewives and 
elderly persons were employed at low wages, led to higher household and 
per capita incomes in the countryside 8.
2) In addition, urban areas began to spread into the surrounding 
countryside. Farmlands began to be used as properties for the construction 
of homes, apartments, parking lots, stores etc. Income from the use of these 
lands further increased the total income of farm households. The growth of 
the Toyota Group and its subcontractors has both created a vast labor 
market and brought about concentrations of populations and factories. 
These concentrations have produced a large demand for factory sites, resi­
dential sites, roads, stores, public facilities etc. This demand for land has 
spilled into the surrounding countryside, leading to a diversified use of 
farmland. Calculating the total area of the 8 cities and 2 towns in which the 
Toyota Group factories are found, we find that in 1987, 231 of 841 km2 of
7 Takeya (1987, pp. 95-104).
8 Looking at the location of villages along national road No. 301 from Toyota City, we 
find that Shimoyama is the second village out of Toyota City and Tsukude is the third. These 
are located about 30 and 60 minutes from Toyota City respectively.
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terrain is used as farmland. This reflects a decrease of 22% between 1964 
and 1974, and a further 15% decrease between 1974 and 1984.
This increased use of farmland as urban building site has led to a 
dramatic increase in land prices. These increased prices have been detrimen­
tal to agricultural production, but they have helped insure the survival of 
farm households, who may sell portions of their lands. Furthermore, as we 
mentioned above, the use of farmlands as commercial areas has spread to 
suburban areas. The construction of apartments, houses, parking lots, etc., 
are often financed by the sales of plots of land.
As a consequence, rents are gained from these sites, and these also add 
to family income. We find that the total income of part time farm house­
holds exceeds that of non-agricultural households. The rise in land prices, 
however, has not spread to marginal or middle areas as of yet. In these 
areas, farm households income is increased only by the employment of a 
higher number of family members.
5. The Stability of Rural Communities and the Development of Both Agricul­
ture and Manufacturing 9
1) Employment at low wages in rural areas has become a well estab­
lished system. This is a source of strength for the Toyota Group and brings 
about a superficial stability in these rural communities. For young workers 
in rural areas, Toyota offers good chances of regular employment. This 
strengthens the system. However, given the establishment of a flexible 
manufacturing system and the recent formation of an international subcon­
tracting system, employees of subcontracting firms in rural areas cannot be 
assured of stable employment.
2) Finally, I would like to analyze the relationship between the 
Toyota Group and the production of agriculture in surrounding rural areas.
The Nishimikawa region is famous for being an area of concentrated 
industries. In terms of agriculture, the region is known for its relatively 
large scale contract farming system. The system of contracting farming in­
volves the granting of farm management to individuals or groups of indi­
viduals. In effect, this system consists of farming on rented land. In the 
Takatana district of Anjyo city, where Nippon Denso Co. is located, 9 
farmers have joined together and established a cooperative group, named 
Takatana Einoukumiai, which is employed in contract farming. In 1989 this
9 Takeya (1987, pp. 109-113).
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group was managing the farming of 119ha and had additional contracts for 
the use and rearrangement of 69ha paddy field and finally contracts for part 
of the production of rice on 30ha. In all this group harvested a total of 
83ha of rice, 105ha of wheat, and 13ha of soybeans. When compared to 
the average size of a Japanese farm, this gives us an idea of the large scale 
contracts this group enters into. Because the average Japanese farm covers 
only lha, the typical farmer works his farm only part time. In the Anjyo 
district, contract farming has grown to encompass 26 groups including 119 
farmers. Two contract farming groups have also been formed in the Takaoka 
district of Toyota City. The expansion of contract farming in Japan is 
shown in Table 1.
Table 1
NUMBER OF JAPANESE FARMS JOINING FARMING ORGANIZATIONS 
(UNITS: 1,000 FARMS, %)
Type of Organization 1972 1976 1985
Total 1,207 (24.1) 1,618 (33.9) 2,313 (52.9)
Joint use of 
agri. machines 467 (9.3) 617 (12.9) 876 (20.0)
Group agreement 
on crop farming 208 (4.1) 197 (4.1) 394 (9.0)
Contract farming 434 (8.6) 684 (14.3) 1,043 (23.8)
Stock raising 98 (2.0) 121 (2.5)
Source: Report on Survey of Organization of Agricultural Production. Ministry of Agri­
culture, Forestry and Fisheries, 1987.
Notes: 1) figures in parenthesis show the ratio of farms joining farming organizations to 
total farms, 2) Data for livestock raised in 1985 is unavailable.
Contract farming began to increase as the number of part time factory 
workers increased, and continued to grow as workers shifted from agricul­
ture to industry. Group contracts on rice farming began in connection with
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Toyota’s aforementioned increase in the use of rural labor. In 1964 the 
practice grew as part time workers contracted out parts of their rice produc­
tion (plowing, planting, harvesting, etc). This coincided with the second 
stage of labor movement, when many rural workers became permanent 
employees. Full contract farming, in which a part time farmer contracts his 
land to full time farmers, began in conjunction with the third stage of the 
transformation of labor, which had firmly established the stratification of 
the rural labor force. As production expanded with the use of the subcon­
tracting system, part time workers shifted more and more towards industry, 
and the use of full contract farming continued to increase.
Based on figures from the agricultural Census, the number of farms 
in the Aichi prefecture that cover between 0.5 and 2.5ha have decreased 
between 1970 and 1985. Farms larger than 2.5ha, on the other hand, have 
increased. The same trend is found for the nation as a whole (with the 
exception of Hokkaido). Remarkably, the number of farms that are 0.3ha 
and less have increased. While part-time farming on small farms has in fact 
increased, farming on a large scale has grown much more.
Furthermore, one must not overlook the intensive farming that is 
developing in suburban areas. As far as the number of intensive farms is 
concerned, one finds that they gready exceed the number of contract farms. 
Intensive farms are organized over large areas for joint use of machinery and 
facilities and include agreements on farming. The organization provides for 
the coordination of production, processing, packaging and sale of produce.
Thus the industrialization and urbanization in the Nishimikawa region 
has brought about a remarkable increase in the number of part-time farming 
family members employed off the farm. At the same time, large numbers of 
farms have become engaged in either contract farming or intensive farming 
arrangements, both of which involve large amounts of investment. We 
should not forget, however, that the total agricultural production of the 
region has fallen. If, for instance, we look at agricultural production in the 
8 cities and 2 towns in which the Toyota Group is located, we find that 
land on which rice was planted fell from 23,000ha in 1968 to ll,592ha in 
1988, a decrease of 50%. Land on which vegetables were planted has fallen 
from 6,044ha to 3,877ha (a 36% decrease). The number of chickens raised 
decreased 13%, while dairy cattle, beef cattle and pork grew 20%, 48% 
and 4% respectively.
Gross agricultural output decreased 12% between 1968 and 1988 in 
real value, and value added decreased 35% in the same period. It is 
therefore clear that total agricultural production has decreased. At the same 
time, however, industrialization has not completely eliminated agriculture
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in the region. As we have seen, the region has in fact seen the formation of 
newly developing farming arrangements.
There are two reasons for this development. The first involves the 
increased income of farm families through their employment in industry. 
This increased income has led many farmers to rent out farmland at low 
rates. The second was the expansion of markets for produce in Nagoya and 
in other surrounding cities. These factors encouraged the development of 
farming in the suburbs.
In the early 1980’s, these developing farms were struck with sharp 
declines in produce prices brought on by overproduction and by competition 
from other areas. These falling prices brought great difficulties. New re­
sponses were developed to meet this crisis, including; (1) the organization 
of almost all farms in a community into a larger structure that is managed as 
one farm, (2) advances in mixed farming, (3) the introduction of processing 
and more direct connections to consumers, (4) the use of biotechnology, (5) 
the production of a wider variety of products, such as organic products, (6) 
the use of computers and information network systems, etc.
In terms of the organization of farms (1), contract farms are joined to 
form a group so that they may improve scale production and avoid excessive 
investment by sharing machinery and facilities. As these groups become 
more integrated, members within the group begin to specialize, and the 
farms are organized as businesses. In larger organizations with large invest­
ments, these groups participate in the innovation of productive processes 
and technology.
In terms of the processing of products (3), farmers begin to take an 
increasing interest in post-harvest activity. The added value of goods is 
increased through processing or through delivery of goods. Furthermore, 
computers are used in the planning of market strategy, financial projections, 
the management of livestock, analysis of technology and the control of 
complex greenhouse environments.
Despite the effects of overproduction and stiff competition, the devel­
opment of farming in this region continues to show the energy necessary for 
innovation and reorganization. This point should be noted as one aspect of 
the restructuring of industry.
There remain, of course, significant differences between the growth of 
the automobile industry and the growth of these developing farms. One 
must remember that the growth of new farming organizations is occurring 
in the context of a decrease in the total agricultural production of the 
region. The growth of these new farms is in fact insufficient to compensate
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for the retreating farmlands. The natural results of all the above will 
probably be an expansion of the disparities among regions.
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RISTRUTTURAZIONE INDUSTRIALE E ORGANIZZAZIONE AGRICOLA 
IN GIAPPONE
L’articolo esamina l’industria automobilistica del gruppo Toyota come caso 
tipico dell’impatto della ristrutturazione industriale sull’agricoltura e sull’occupa­
zione in Giappone. Gli aspetti trattati sono: lo sviluppo del sistema del lavoro 
eseguito all’esterno dell’azienda madre attraverso contratti di appalto e subappal­
to, i meccanismi con i quali il lavoro proviene dalle campagne, il diffondersi del 
mercato del lavoro nelle zone rurali, le differenze salariali fra le generazioni. La 
progressiva trasformazione del terreno agricolo in zone urbane e suburbane ha 
come conseguenza la diminuzione della produzione agricola complessiva nono­
stante l’uso intensivo del terreno agricolo e le innovazioni nelle tecniche di colti­
vazione.
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INDUSTRIALIZATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL LINKAGE 
BETWEEN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY IN CHINA
WITH A DISCUSSION ON THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE
by
L iq u n  J ia *
I. Introduction
Since 1985, China’s economic reform has faced some serious problems: 
the stagnation in agriculture, the wider gap between industrial and agricul­
tural growth, the continuing biased investment towards industrial sectors, 
the serious inflation in agricultural products and other consumer goods, and 
the unsatisfactory employment structure and income distribution between 
urban and rural areas. These troubles force the policy-maker to reconsider 
the concept of balanced development as well as the effective technological 
linkage between industry and agriculture. The fundamental questions focus 
on the following points. (1) What kind of balanced development between 
the two sectors would be suitable to China’s present economic development 
stage. (2) What are the main factors that substantially impair the establish­
ment of a dynamic and organic technological linkage between the two 
sectors. (3) What possible way could be found to adjust the present 
structure and solve the dilemma. In order to answer these questions in a 
right way, we have to make theoretical and empirical analyses on the 
technological linkage between industry and agriculture during the process 
of industrialization in China.
In this paper, we discuss the above questions beginning in Section II 
with an analysis of the three stages of industrialization and correspondingly, 
the different characteristics of the linkage between industry and agriculture
* Department of Economics, University of Otago, Dunedin (New Zealand).
I wish to thank Associate Prof. Priyatosh Maitra and Prof. Erkin Bairam for their valuable 
comments. The important assistance of Ms. Olga Pedder is also appreciated.
1100 LIQUN JIA
during the three stages. The emphasis will be on how different patterns of 
technological evolution and employment structural change in developed 
and developing countries affect the dynamic linkage between both sectors. 
Section III will review the Chinese industrialization process and analyse 
the dichotomy between industry and agriculture. Section IV will discuss the 
causes impeding the establishment of the technological linkage between 
both sectors. In Section V, the Japanese experience is referred to and the 
possible countermeasures for the Chinese to improve their technological 
linkage of both sectors are discussed. Concluding remarks will be presented 
in Section VI of the paper.
II. The Development Stages of Industrialization and the Technological Link­
age between Industry and Agriculture
With increasing production, raising national income and spreading its 
benefits widely by expanding employment opportunities, industrialization 
has been regarded as an historical progress. As a necessary evolution from 
traditional economy to modern economy, the industrialization process must 
be accompanied by a dynamic reallocation of economic resources between 
industry and agriculture. With the expansion of manufacture, agricultural 
resources have gradually shifted into the industrial sectors. Therefore, the 
change of the production structure tends to increase the share of industrial 
production and decrease that of agricultural production. Simultaneously, 
the change of the employment structure follows the same trend. The whole 
process of industrialization can be divided into three different development 
stages in terms of the change of production and employment structure.
The first stage-, the initial industrial development stage begins with a 
primitive capital accumulation. At this stage capital accumulation takes 
place without technological progress. The extensive growth by the large injec­
tion of capital and labour into industrial sectors is the main technological 
characteristic: “It is the period of manufacture proper based on the division 
of labour to use labour more productively on an enlarged organization by 
amassing more plants and more workers to produce more of the same 
output in the same way” \  Owing to an industrial priority policy, industry 
begins a rapid expansion and its production growth is much faster than that 
of agricultural production. The share of industry in relation to agriculture in
1 For a detailed discussion about extensive and intensive industrial development see 
Maitra (1980, Ch. II and III; 1986, Ch. 2; and 1991).
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total output and employment and the ratio of urban population can indicate 
the pace of industrialization. According to some cross-country studies 2, by 
the end of this first industrial development stage, the average output 
proportion between industry and agriculture is 6:4, the share of employ­
ment in agriculture is 60 percent, and the rate of the urban population is 
around 35 percent.
At this initial stage of industrial development, the main characteristic 
of the linkage between industry and agriculture is that agriculture supports 
industry, i.e., agricultural sectors provide food products, raw materials, 
capital outlay, labour force and market to industrial sectors. That is to say, 
the initial industrial expansion has to rely mainly on the agricultural 
accumulation.
In transferring resources, the state intervention can stimulate a rapid 
industrial accumulation by a policy protecting industry. The government, 
however, must carefully deal with the contradiction between the demand 
and the supply of agricultural resources. As viewed from the demand, the 
more resources are drained from agriculture, the faster industrial expansion 
will be and the shorter the time needed for industrial primitive accumula­
tion. However, viewing from the supply side, if the resources from the 
agricultural sectors are too many, this impairs agricultural reproduction, 
and thereafter slows down its growth speed and reduces the future supply 
of agricultural products. As a result, industrial expansion is eventually 
impeded. Therefore, there is a dilemma between getting more agricultural 
surplus and keeping effective agricultural growth. To handle this contradic­
tion, the policy-maker should consider a balanced development between 
industrial expansion and agricultural growth. In order to keep the resources 
drained from agriculture within the agricultural supporting capability, a 
basic principle is first of all to guarantee the agricultural reproduction 
and a gradual increase of the peasants’ income, and then to extract the rest 
of the agricultural surplus to support industrialization.
The second stage: the middle industrial development stage begins with 
the end of the primitive capital accumulation. At this stage, the industrial 
sectors lacking the capability of self-adjustment and self-improvement have 
established a relatively solid industrial basis for self-development and self- 
support. Therefore, the further expansion of industry does no longer rely 
on agricultural accumulation. This means that agricultural surplus can be 
reinvested back in the development of agriculture itself. With this kind of 
reinvestment or self-accumulation, agricultural growth accelerates. Therefore
2 See Feng and Li (1989, p. 44).
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the gap between industrial growth and agricultural growth tends to be 
narrowed and then a balanced development between both sectors appears. 
However, with the strengthening of industrial capability, a wide expansion 
of industry begins, and this leads to a larger and larger share of industrial 
output. Feng and Li’s cross-country study shows that, by the end of the 
second stage, the average output proportion between industry and agriculture 
is around 8:2; the share of employment in agriculture is 40 percent and the 
rate of the urban population is 50 percent.
At this second stage, the technological linkage between industry and 
agriculture is realized mainly through an equal exchange between industrial 
products and agricultural products. So the key factor which affects the 
linkage is the existence of a reasonable price and market system. During 
this period, the government can use some important economic mechanisms, 
such as planning, taxation, state budget and price control, to change an 
unreasonable price structure, narrow the “price scissors” between industrial 
products and agricultural products, adjust the orientation of investment, 
and stimulate both sectors improving their economic efficiency, speeding 
up their capital accumulation and keeping their development balanced.
The third stage: the mature stage of industrialization. At this stage, 
the whole national economic development mainly depends on industrial 
accumulation. However, the share of the industrial output begins to decline 
owing to a rapid growth of the service sectors. Agricultural develop­
ment begins to be influenced by industrial sectors. With the industry’s 
support, the modernization of agriculture is gradually realized. Therefore 
the technological dichotomy between industry and agriculture tends to 
disappear. In the meantime, with a rapid increase of agricultural production 
and the peasants’ income, the gap of living standards between the urban 
and the rural population is ultimately eliminated. This new relationship 
between industry and agriculture indicates that industrialization has entered 
a mature stage, i.e., a modern economic development era.
The above analyses of the different stages of industrialization and the 
technological linkage between industry and agriculture are mainly based on 
the shift of such resources as products, income and capital formation. Little 
concern has been given to the transfer of the labour force. In fact, during 
the process of industrialization, labour force moving from agricultural 
sectors to industrial sectors is also a sort of capital transfer. This industrial 
labour force which comes from agricultural sectors does not belong to the 
marginal agricultural unemployed. Those workers possess a high opportunity 
cost because their working skill directly derived from agricultural devel­
opment can be easily absorbed by industrial sectors. Therefore, they are
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valuable human capital. It is this sort of capital transfer that makes the 
technological linkage between industry and agriculture dynamic and self- 
sustaining.
In the above, the changes of employment structure in the different 
stages of industrialization were indicated by the figures about the share of 
the labour force in industry and agriculture, and the rate of population 
distributed in urban and rural areas. However, those figures can only reflect 
an average or general trend in all countries. In fact, the change of employ­
ment structure is quite different in the different countries. The following 
analyses will show that there are three different patterns of employment 
structural change in agricultural and industrial sectors.
Case 1 : the pioneer industrialized country: England. In the UK, the 
change of the employment structure and the technological change happened 
simultaneously and synchronously. The industrial evolution was affected by 
a plentiful supply of agricultural surplus labour resulting from the change 
from an extensive to an intensive growth. At the initial stage of industrializa­
tion, industrial technology emerged from agriculture: “the population pres­
sure spurred agrarian innovation leading to the Industrial Revolution” 3. 
Based on the labour division, labour absorbing technology dominated in 
small scale industrial sectors and led to a rapid expansion of indigenous 
technological innovation. At this initial stage, it was agricultural sectors 
that provided industrial sectors a large number of surplus labour. According 
to Hicks, the Industrial Revolution is the rise of modern industry from a 
rural domestic industry combined with the growth of population. The first 
phase of industrialization was marked by the rapid growth of a traditionally 
organized rural industry which emerged as a means of temporarily employ­
ing labour to augment income of overcrowded agriculture, This helped to 
offset the tendency towards diminishing returns. The adoption of industry 
by a growing number of peasants during proto-industrialization meant that 
labour previously unemployed or under-employed during a part of the year 
was put to work on a more continuous basis 4. This in turn resulted in the 
supply of more productive inputs (e.g. iron plough) to agricultural and non­
food consumer sectors. Therefore an organic and dynamic technological 
linkage between the two sectors emerged.
Later an increasingly complex activity continued to call for a massive 
increase of labour. However, by the end of the 19th century, the labour 
supply began to expand less rapidly and with the growth of specialized 
trades became less homogeneous. Since the agricultural sector could not
5 See Boserup (1981).
4 See H icks (1969, p. 141).
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provide surplus labour as before to meet the need of industrial expansion, 
industrial sectors had to pave the way to intensive growth by using the 
existing resources more productively through improving technology, using 
mechanical power and developing large factory organizations. Therefore, 
from the end of the mid-development stage of industrialization onwards, 
capital intensive technology gradually dominated in the UK industrial 
sectors. Undoubtedly, when this kind of capital intensive technology is 
transferred into those countries where labour force is relatively plentiful, 
the labour absorption in industry and labour transfer from agriculture are 
restricted so that the technological linkage between the two sectors may be 
impaired.Case 2: the lately developed countries. The employment structural 
change in these countries is slower than in England, the pioneer industrialized 
country. The technological development in these countries, such as France, 
Germany, the United States and Japan did not evolve from their own 
traditional stage but relied on the technology transferred from the already 
industrialized countries (e.g. France imported technology from the UK and 
so did Japan from the Western countries). Therefore their technological 
linkage between industry and agriculture was bound to be affected by 
the imported technology. According to some studies 5, in these countries, 
although there was no difficulty in establishing linkages between the two 
sectors in terms of commodities and saving and market factors, the devel­
opment of a vital and dynamic linkage in terms of labour factors was still 
lacking. This situation can be reflected by a dynamic change in the sectoral 
distribution of labour force. Table 1 lists five developed and developing 
countries’ share of agricultural employment in total employment. It indicates 
that labour force transfer from agriculture in France and Japan was slower 
than in the UK, suggesting that to a certain extent in France and Japan 
the imported capital intensive technology had limited the labour force 
absorption into the industrial sectors. Nevertheless, the situation in France 
was much better than in Japan because the technology transfer to France 
initiated at the late extensive phase when technology was still labour 
absorbing while the population growth rate in France was around 0.4-0.6 
percent -  much lower than that in Japan. However, this problem was less 
acute as compared with the case of the Third World countries like India and 
China where a relatively higher capital intensive technology was imported 
after the 1950s.Case 3: Most of the Third World countries. In these countries, indus-
’ See, for instance, Maitra (1991).
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Table 1
FIVE COUNTRIES’ AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT 
AS PROPORTION OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
Country Year Proportion





























Sources: The data of England and Wales, France, Japan and India are from Maitra (1991) 
and the data of China are from Chinese Statistic Yearbook (1988, p. 157).
trial sectors had a very limited capability of absorbing surplus agricultural 
labour force, so the change of the employment structure lagged quite 
far behind the change of the output structure for both sectors. The establish­
1106 LIQUN JIA
ment of modern industrial sectors in most Third World countries was 
mainly based on the imported technology which came directly or indirectly 
from the Western developed countries. As we know, since the middle of 
the 20th century, the industrialization in most developed countries has 
entered a modern phase of intensive growth and a relatively productive and 
high capital intensive technology has prevailed in their industrial sectors. 
When this kind of technology was introduced into the underdeveloped 
Third World countries where a high population growth pressure was a 
dramatic problem and the factor endowment was largely offset by a surplus 
of agricultural labour, it not only prevented modern industry from absorbing 
more labour forces but also hindered the increase of productivity in agri­
culture. Therefore the dichotomy between agriculture and industry became 
worse and worse.
Let us analyse the growing productivity gap between agriculture and 
industry in India in terms of the differences in ability to absorb labour 
productively as technology changed. In 1960, the 74 percent of the labour 
force of India engaged in agriculture contributed 50 percent of national 
income, while 20 percent of national income was contributed by industrial 
sectors with 11 percent of the labour force. In 1981, agriculture’s share of 
national income dropped to 37 percent but the change of agricultural labour 
force kept stagnant (only dropped 5 percentage points to 69 percent in over 
twenty years). And the industry’s share of national income went up to 26 
percent but that of the labour force by only 13 percent, which indicated the 
use of highly capital intensive technology 6. The net result was that the gap 
of productivity between industry and agriculture widened instead of being 
reduced.
III. The Chinese Industrialization and the Linkage between Industry and
Agriculture during the Last Forty Years
To judge whether the present Chinese industrial and agricultural devel­
opment is well coordinated and to analyse the economic and technological 
linkage between, industry and agriculture in China we have to examine the 
stage the Chinese industrialization is presently going through.
Since the early 1950s, the Chinese industrialization has been going on 
for forty years. Throughout this historical process, we can find that the 
Chinese industrialization has the following three characteristics.
6 See Maitra (1991).
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First: low starting point and poor technological foundation. In 1952, 
the Chinese per capita GNP was less than one hundred US dollars, the 
share of net industrial output in the total material product was 23 percent, 
about 83.5 percent of the labour force was engaged in agriculture, and the 
urban population accounted only for 10 percent of the total population. 
It was under these bad conditions that China began her industrializing 
construction.
Second: priority was given to heavy industry and large and medium 
state-owned enterprises. This biased policy has led to a neglect of the 
development of the indigenous technology and stimulated an over-demand 
for capital intensive technology which had to be imported from overseas.
In spite of her autarkic, import-substitution policy for promoting 
national independence, learning by doing, and self reliance in the long run, 
China actually depended heavily on the Soviet technological aid at the 
beginning of her industrialization. In the 1950s, China introduced 156 
large scale industrial projects from the Soviet Union and Eastern European 
countries. Up to 1957, about 595 large and medium engineering plants 
had gone into operation and most of them were based on the USSR 
technological assistance. Since the early 1960s, China has been shifting 
towards the Japanese and Western European technological markets to 
meet her industrial demand for up-to-date technologies, and increasingly, 
towards the United States since the late 1970s.
The borrowed Western (including the Soviet Union) technology was 
developed in response to the need to substitute machinery for scarce labour. 
Its lack of application in China was bound to widen the technological gap -  
and at an accelerating rate -  given the mounting population pressure during 
the past forty years. Here, we highlight some of the more dramatic technolog­
ical disparities which exist within Chinese industrial enterprises. Most strik­
ingly, as of 1987, large and medium scale industries constituted only 2 per­
cent of all industrial enterprises, but absorbed one-third of the country’s 
industrial labour force and two-thirds of fixed capital stock. From this they 
contributed 50 percent of the gross industrial output, and their turnover taxes 
and remitted profits accounted for 65 percent of the state revenues. Such 
figures indicate the much higher average capital intensity and income-generat­
ing power of large and medium enterprises, compared with their smaller 
counterparts. Even the medium-size enterprises were large in scale: in 
1987, their levels of output, employment and capital stock were 26,14 
and 33 times greater than those of small-scale enterprises. This implied
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difference in average capital-labour ratio between medium and small scale 
enterprises was between 1 and 2.4 7.
Third: the primitive capital accumulation for industrialization mainly 
relied on agriculture. To construct heavy industry and large and medium 
state-owned enterprises required a large financial support. Unfortunately, at 
that time, China could only get very limited foreign assistance. Therefore 
the hard task of primitive industrial capital accumulation fell to agricultural 
sectors. It is estimated that more than half of the industrial accumulation 
funds were collected or squeezed from agricultural sectors during the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s. Chinese agriculture provided funds for primitive industrial 
capital accumulation mainly through two channels, i.e., agricultural taxes 
and “the price scissors” between agricultural goods and industrial goods. 
According to Chinese official statistics, from 1952 to 1986, agriculture 
turned over 104.38 billion yuan tax revenues to the state; and through “the 
price scissors”, the state extracted 582.4 billion yuan from agricultural 
sectors — over 5 times of agricultural taxes. (The difference of “the price 
scissors” between agricultural goods and industrial goods has increased by a 
big margin during the last forty years: it increased from 6.5 percent in 
1952 to 40.2 percent in 1957, 52.9 percent in 1960, and 54.4 percent in 
1978. After 1979, it was reduced a little bit but has increased again since 
1985). Taking together agricultural taxes and the difference of “the price 
scissors”, 686.78 billion yuan made up 18.5 percent of the total net value 
of agricultural output8. Of course, in order to work out the net agricultural 
contribution to industry we should deduct the state investment in agriculture. 
From 1952 to 1983, through financial and credit channels, the state allocated 
232.6 billion yuan to agriculture as direct investment and rural relief 
funds — only one-third of the amount extracted from agriculture, or 6.1 
percent of total net value of agricultural output. Therefore, deducting this 
state agricultural input, Chinese agriculture contributed 12.4 percent of its 
net value of output to industry without reward every year 9.
Then which stage is the present Chinese industrialization going 
through? According to Chinese official statistics, in 1987 the ratio of ind­
ustrial output to agricultural output was 7.5: 2.5; agricultural labour force 
made up 60.1 percent of the national workforce and urban population 
was about 25 percent of the total population 10. Compared with the 
corresponding figures in 1952, obviously, industrial production grew quite
7 See Kueh (1990, p. 431).
8 See Chen (1988, p. 14).
9 See Feng and Li (1989, p. 47).
10 The ratio of industrial output to agricultural output and the proportion of agricultural
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fast, but the changes of the employment structure and of the urban-rural 
population structure lagged far behind the change of the output structure. 
The former indicator implies that industrialization is going through the second 
stage but the latter two indicators suggest that industrialization is still at the 
first stage. Comprehensively, we can only say that the Chinese industrializa­
tion has basically completed primitive industrial capital accumulation and 
has begun to step into the second or the middle development stage.
As concerns the technological linkage between industry and agriculture, 
the above analysed characteristics of Chinese industrialization have the 
obvious implication that Chinese industry has expanded at the expense 
of agriculture. It is worthwhile noticing that even in the current rural 
reform the tendency towards ignoring, restricting even discriminating against 
agriculture is still a serious problem, and by contrast, industrial sectors, 
especially heavy industrial sectors, have continued to be given priority in 
development programmes. Capital investment in agriculture is depressed. 
The public financial resources available for agricultural capital investment, 
which are derived principally from land taxation, are extremely limited; 
while under the serious exploitation by industry, agriculture itself is actually 
lacking the capability of “self-reliance” even if it wants to respond to this 
state call. The state agricultural investment amounted to 5792 million yuan 
in 1979, constituting 11.1 percent of total government investment, while 
investment decreased to 3506 million yuan (only 3 percent of total gov­
ernment investment) in 1986 n . Consistent with the decrease of invest­
ment in physical capital construction, the investment in human capital of 
agriculture is also depressed. Up to now about one-fourth of the farm 
people are illiterate, and the school attendance rate in rural regions has 
tended to decline. A simple survey made in 1983 showed that around 30 
percent of children aged 13-16 dropped out of the education system and 
6.2 percent of them never attended school.
Undoubtedly, biased investment orientation is bound to disrupt the 
technological linkage between industry and agriculture. The following 
analyses may indicate how weak the production and employment linkages 
between the two sectors are.
The production linkage. — As is known, Chinese agriculture is the main 
supplier of the industrializing process. Besides the above mentioned direct 
contributions of such resources as foods, raw materials, capital funds, 1
labour force are derived from Chinese Statistic Yearbook (1988, p. 47 and 157). The proportion 
of urban population is estimated by Feng and Li (1989, p. 48).
11 See Zhu (1990).
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labour force and market, agriculture also provided another indirect resource 
— foreign exchange to industry for the importation of capital and other 
production materials, through foreign trade.
Over a long period of time, China insisted on paying imported capital 
goods in cash, rejected foreign investment as inherently imperialistic, and 
practiced a form of “self-reliance” that left only marginal room for foreign 
trade. As the main earners of foreign exchange, agricultural sectors were 
forced to export a lot of products to meet the needs of foreign exchange by 
industrial sectors. According to Chinese statistics, in 1987 the exportation 
of primary products including agricultural and mineral products still made 
up about 35 percent of the total exported goods.
In contrast with the great agricultural contribution of physical re­
sources to industry the industrial sector made very little contribution to 
agricultural modernization. After a relatively comprehensive industrial 
foundation was established, Chinese industrial expansion ran into a vicious 
“autocircle” towards self-service, i.e., industrial sectors mainly produced 
those capital goods which could only be utilized by themselves, instead of 
making the production serve the agricultural modernization. This vicious 
“autocircle” further widened the technological disparities between industry 
and agriculture. Consequently, after four decades’ industrialization, agricul­
tural work still relied mainly on animal power and manual labour. In 
1985, productive fixed capital (excluding land) in agriculture was less than 
2000 billion yuan: on average, only 200-250 yuan per capita for rural 
people; whereas it was at least 3000 yuan per capita for urban people 12.
The employment linkage. — We have noticed before that, like most of 
the Third World countries, in China the adoption of imported capital in­
tensive technology and the strategy giving priority to heavy industry prevents 
industrial sectors from absorbing surplus agricultural labour force. Another 
restriction which actually hinders the movement of labour force from 
agriculture to industry is to be attributed to a regulation system: the urban 
resident registering control. Under this system urban people are offered 
a residence card with many privileges including enjoying the allocation 
of foods, fuels and houses, and getting the opportunities of education, 
employment, health service and other urban advantages. Without this 
residence permit no farming people can survive in the urban area. Therefore, 
by this “closed door” policy the migration out of rural areas into the urban 
industrial centres has been greatly prevented. Some Chinese economists
12 See D ing (1990, p. 65).
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believe that this regulational restriction is stronger than the technological 
one in impeding the employment linkage between agriculture and industry.
Of course, on the other hand, this policy can prevent the growth of 
urban slums which support surplus labour but hinder the urban facilities in 
terms of the urban development experiments of some Latin American, 
Indian and African countries. However, we think that the crux of the 
matter for China should lie in stimulating production rather than restraining 
distribution and consumption. Therefore, instead of pursuing a passive 
and invidious closed door policy in urban areas, China would do better 
decentralize her economy sufficiently and liberalize the circulation of human 
and physical resources in order to sustain higher output growth both in 
agriculture and industry.
Under the above technological and regulational restrictions, the employ­
ment opportunities created by the industrial sector are very limited and 
they cannot even meet the demand of the urban population. From 1979 to 
1987, the average annual increase of the industrial labour force was only 
about 3.5 percent, much slower than the increase of industrial production 
(per annual increase of industrial production was 12 percent). During the
Table 2
THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY 
AND SERVICE SECTORS TO NATIONAL OUTPUT 
AND LABOUR FORCE IN CHINA, 1952-87
1952 1957 1978 1982 1987
Share in net 
material product (%)
A 57.7 46.8 32.8 40.4 33.8
I 23.1 33.3 53.6 50.6 52.3
S 19.2 19.9 13.7 8.9 13.8
Share in labour force (%)
A 83.5 81.2 70.7 68.3 60.1
I 7.4 9.0 17.4 18.5 22.3
S 9.1 9.8 11.9 13.2 17.6
Relative product per labour (%)
A 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6
I 3.1 3.7 3.1 2.7 2.3
S 2.1 2.0 1.2 0.7 0.8
Sources: The data are derived from Chinese Statistic Yearbook (1988, p. 51 and 157). 
Notes: A =  Agriculture, I =  Industry and S =  Services.
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Table 3
FOUR COUNTRIES’ RATIOS OF PRODUCTIVITY IN INDUSTRY 
TO PRODUCTIVITY IN AGRICULTURE
England Japan India China
1960 1981 1960 1981 1960 1981 1952 1981
1.8 0.8 3.8 3.3 2.7 3.7 4.4 4.7
Sources: The data of England, Japan and India are from Maitra (1991) and for China’s data 
see the sources of Table 2.
last ten years, although about 90 million peasants left agricultural produc­
tion, most of them were not absorbed by industrial sectors but by service 
sectors and rural-township enterprises 13.
Table 2 shows a stark contrast in productivity between industry and 
agriculture. We notice that, in 1987, each one percent of the workforce 
taken from the national pool by industry contributed 2.3 percent of national 
income as compared with a mere 0.6 percent in the case of agriculture. 
Table 3 lists four countries’ ratio of productivity in industry to productivity 
in agriculture. It indicates that China’s productivity gap between agriculture 
and industry has widened instead of being reduced like in Japan and the 
UK: in Japan, the gap was high but was declining while in the UK the ratio 
was lower than 1 in 1981. And in India the same tendency was shown but 
the gap was narrower than in China.
IV. The Factors Impeding the Establishment of the Technological Linkage
between Agriculture and Industry
The above review of the Chinese industrialization suggests that there 
are three major factors which substantially impair the establishment of a 
dynamic and organic technological linkage between Chinese agriculture and 
industry.
(1) Technological factor: the imported and the self-developed capital
15 See D ing (1990, p. 65).
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intensive technology has restricted the expansion of labour intensive indige­
nous technology and the absorption of surplus agricultural labour force into 
industrial sectors.
(2) Policy factor: heavy industry priority policy has directed industrial 
sectors, especially the heavy industrial sectors, towards a biased production 
orientation, a sort of vicious “autocircle” which encouraged a self-service 
development in the industrial sectors at the expense of agricultural de­
velopment.
(3) Regulational factor: an urban resident registering control has 
closed the door against the free movement of labour force from agriculture 
to industrial centres and blocked the spreading of the industrialization 
benefits into the agricultural sectors by giving the privileges to urban 
people and restricting the absorption of agricultural labour force into in­
dustry.
Further examining the matter from various angles, it is not difficult to 
find that the Chinese habit of self-reliance is the ideological root of the 
mistakes in linking up the two sectors 14. As is well known, the Chinese see 
the principle of self-reliance as a matter of self-respect and honour; self- 
confidence and relying on one’s own human and natural resources means 
to be capable of setting one’s own goals and taking one’s autonomous 
decisions. This fundamental principle has fostered economic, cultural, 
scientific and technological introversion, seclusion, inertia and autarkic 
development. When this principle as a guiding ideology was implemented 
everywhere including the areas of external relations and internal units, even 
in very small units, all authorities at any levels scrambled for power, 
resources and wealth to further their particular interests (conceiving their 
interests as an emphasis on self-reliance). They decried their dependence 
on inflows from other regions and sectors and announced their progress 
towards self-sufficiency in a wide variety of products which were mostly 
achieved by misallocating resources. This was bound to lead to protectionism 
and isolation all over the country. Undeniably, the economic penalties were 
great. The above review tends to confirm the truism that Chinese self- 
reliance ideology destroys the natural economic and technological coordina­
tion between regions and sectors and retards the country’s technological 
performance and even the capacity of self-reliance.
14 For a detailed discussion see J ia (1990, pp. 5-45).
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V. The Japanese Experience and the Possible Countermeasures for the 
Chinese to Achieve the Technological Linkage between Industry and Agri­
culture.
Since the Chinese industrialization has stepped into the second de­
velopment stage with a completion of the primitive capital accumulation 
and an establishment of a comprehensive industrial foundation, a new 
relationship between agriculture and industry as analysed in Section II is to 
be established. Now the basic principles for coordinating both sectors’ 
development can be recommended as follows: the industrial sector should 
not squeeze agricultural resources lopsidedly any more; the agricultural 
sector should not provide industrial capital accumulation gratis any more; 
government should not continue to give the priority to industrial sectors, 
especially to the heavy industrial sectors; and the expansion of both 
industrial and agricultural sectors should rely only on their own accumula­
tion rather than on their mutual financial support.
Of course, it is not as easy as that to readjust the old production and 
employment structure and well coordinate a balanced development of both 
sectors because some of the restrictions analysed above are going to be hard 
to eliminate in the immediate future. For example, although the imported 
and the self-developed capital intensive technological foundation has been 
established, the restrictions in absorbing surplus agricultural labour force 
and expanding the indigenous labour intensive technology still exist. What 
the Chinese government should consider is how to adopt some effective 
methods for reducing the restrictions to a minimum. From the following 
brief discussion about the Japanese industrialization experience, we may 
gain some suggestions for the Chinese situation.
Let us consider the Japanese approach to modern industrial growth: in 
Japan the early period of industrialization, i.e., 1880-1915, was followed 
by a simultaneous extensive and intensive phase during which Japan 
developed her own traditional technology in agricultural and small scale 
industries, and side by side imported relatively advanced capital, skill 
and technology for her modern industrial expansion. By this way, both 
agricultural and industrial sectors used the existing human and physical 
resources productively.
Concomitantly with this simultaneous extensive and intensive growth, 
Japan adopted a combined labour intensive technology and a capital 
intensive technology. Japan used her traditional agricultural technology, 
particularly traditional fertiliser during the Tokugawa period. The demo­
graphic pressure in agriculture combined with a traditional technology
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resulted in the operation of the Law of Diminishing Returns and different 
developments began to emerge. Japan instead of trying to develop her 
traditional fertilizer, began to import modern chemical fertilizer. However, 
modern fertilizer at that time was less capital intensive than that which is 
presendy used in the Third World countries. Therefore, by using this modern 
chemical fertilizer, Japan could pursue the same land-intensive approach to 
keep as much labour as possible in agriculture. While promoting modern 
capital intensive technology, Japan also encouraged labour intensive small 
industries supplying parts and accessories to large establishments (sub­
contracting business) and expanded service sectors based on family labor. 
This process continued even after the WWII. These small scale industrial 
and service sectors in Japan absorbed a much larger portion of labour force 
than in the USA and the UK today 15.
Another valuable experience during the Japanese industrialization 
process is that the expansion of agriculture and light industry played a 
significant role as a demand-side factor which fostered the expansion of the 
heavy and chemical industries 16. The interaction between these sectors 
generated investment opportunities. Let us take the Japanese agriculture 
and textile and chemical industries as examples: for heavy industrialization, 
agriculture played the most important role in capital accumulation, and the 
textile industry was the foreign currency earner. These two sectors required 
the development of the chemical industry which supplied f e r t i l iz e r  and 
dyestuff. The expansion of agriculture created investment opportunities for 
the products of the chemical industry. Then chemical expansion further 
increased agriculture and textile inputs and outputs. Thus the well organized 
circle among these sectors in which one sector’s investment and expansion 
stimulates the other’s was established.
Finally, over a long prewar period the Japanese industrial expansion 
was characterized, like in China, by import substitution. The degree of 
dependence on imports, which is represented by the import ratio was only 
from a little under 10 percent to around 15 percent from the first half of 
the 1880s to the middle of the 1930s 17. Of course, during this period, also 
the two openings of Japan in 1854 and 1945 were responsible for her 
subsequent industrial and technical virtuosity. It is worthwhile noticing here 
that the Japanese attained a successful assimilation of imported Western 
technology in a very creative way: rethinking, redesigning, remachining, 
retooling and repairing. In Japan, a full play of the demonstration effects
15 See Ohkawa (1965) and Maitra (1991).
16 See Yanagihara (1989, p. 359).
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of imported Western equipments, products, personnel and blueprints stimul­
ated the learning process inherent in indigenous technological efforts, and 
accelerated an overall national economic and technological take-off 18.
All of these efforts made Japan able to achieve a fundamental relation­
ship between agriculture and industry; this process went through fluctuat­
ing phases and took a long time. Comparing Japan with the UK, France, 
India and China, the Japanese agriculture made much greater factor contribu­
tions, both labour and capital, to industrial growth than the Chinese and 
Indian agriculture, but much less than the British and French agriculture at 
their earlier stage (see Table 1). And so did the industrial sectors to 
agricultural growth by supplying chemical fertilizers, capital equipments 
and other products and technologies.
Undeniably, there are some limitations for the Chinese to learn from 
the Japanese experience due to the different development patterns, times 
and systems between the two countries. For example, when Japan started 
industrialization, the technology in the world was less capital intensive than 
it has been since the 1950s, therefore Japanese industry absorbed more 
labour force than Chinese industry did even if they both used imported 
technology from the Western countries. Considering the fundamental nature 
of the demographic change at the initial stage of industrialization, Japan faced 
much lower population pressure than China: in Japan, the population growth 
rate was less than one percent while in China it was 2.5 percent. Besides, 
Japan could easily support industrialization with the foreign currency 
earned through the exports of agricultural and textile products which in 
those days were much in demand on international markets. In short, as 
compared with China Japan was favored in terms of: (1) imports of less 
capital intensive technology, (2) population growth and (3) exports of 
agricultural and textile products. Therefore, when learning from the Japanese 
experience, Chinese government has to work out some special policy to 
reduce these objective limitations.
The following are a few policy recommendations aimed at readjusting 
the erratic technological linkage between Chinese industry and agriculture.
— Readjusting the price structure of agricultural and industrial goods and 
increasing the state agricultural investment.
Obviously, so long as “the price scissors” between agricultural and 
industrial goods exist, it is impossible to stop the industrial sector from 
draining capital resources from the agricultural sector, and so long as this
See Blumenthal and Lee (1985, pp. 221-224) and Bideleux (1985, p. 153).
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draining goes on both sectors cannot realize their production expansion by 
relying only on their own accumulation. However, at China’s present stage 
the condition is not ripe yet for completely eliminating “the price scissors”. 
Considering the present inflationary pressure and the situation of public 
finances the government may solve the problem by such combined methods 
as: gradually adjusting the prices of those agricultural products which will 
be consumed by the urban people and of those capital goods which will 
be used as inputs in the agricultural production while allocating more 
investment funds to the agricultural sector for compensating its loss in 
the commodity exchange with the other sectors. More precisely, the state 
agricultural investment should be greater than the amount of agricultural 
tax revenues minus the agricultural share in the national income reallocation. 
Indicated by a formula:
A, >  At -  As
where, A(, At and As represent state agricultural investment, agricultural 
tax revenues and agricultural share in the national income reallocation, 
respectively.
— Readjusting the employment structure between agriculture and industry 
hy expanding rural and township enterprises and rescinding the urban resident 
registering control.
The adjustment of the employment structure cannot be realized unless 
more indigenous technologies, labour intensive industries and small scale 
enterprises can be further expanded in rural and urban areas. Otherwise, 
eventual social disturbances arising irom unemployment pressure may make 
the second stage of industrialization fail before any goals have been achieved. 
During the last ten years, Chinese rural and township enterprises have 
played an important role in absorbing the surplus of agricultural labour force, 
adjusting the traditional production structure, increasing both agricultural 
and industrial outputs, providing rural accumulation funds and supporting 
urban industrialization. Therefore it is significant to promote their devel­
opment. At present, it is necessary to abolish the existing privileges of 
urban large and medium enterprises in order at least to create an equal 
opportunity for rural and township enterprises to be competitive through 
the development of a market allocation system.
To make the rural and urban economic reform more effective, the 
Chinese government should consider rescinding the urban resident register­
ing control. Otherwise, the free movement (under the effect of the natural 
law) of labour force between agricultural and industrial areas cannot be
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realized completely and the balance between employment structure, urban- 
rural population distribution and production structure cannot be achieved 
properly.
— Readjusting industrial policy to stimulate the improvement of indus­
trial efficiency.At the second stage of industrialization, the improvement of industrial 
efficiency is the most important factor for lifting agriculture from an 
unrewarding position of supplier of industrial accumulation, and keeping 
the balanced development between agriculture and industry. Chinese industry 
has always had the problem of a poor productivity. This problem is 
particularly serious now 19. Therefore, the government should really pay 
great attention to it and work out some effective policy to solve it as 
soon as possible. The basic principle of the new policy should focus 
on encouraging or stimulating industrial sectors: to strengthen intensive 
growth by relying on their own accumulation and using the existing 
resources more productively, to orient industrial production towards serving 
agriculture and light industry, and in the meantime, to create more employ­
ment opportunities for absorbing surplus agricultural labour force.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper surveys the technological linkage between agriculture and 
industry in China during the last four decades of her industrialization 
process, analyses the factors impeding the balanced development between 
both sectors and suggests the possible countermeasures for dealing with the 
current dilemma.
Firstly, we find that the Chinese pattern of industrialization was 
different from that in the pioneer industrialized countries as well as from 
that in lately developed ones. This is the result of the adoption of a policy 
giving priority to heavy industry and of the introduction of relatively capital 
intensive technology. Secondly, we ascertain that, through forty years of 
industrialization, China has now completed the primitive industrial capital 
accumulation, established a relatively comprehensive industrial foundation 
and has stepped into the second development stage of industrialization. 
However, the benefits of industrialization have not yet spread widely into 
the agricultural sectors and rural areas. We notice that the allocation of
19 For a quantitative analysis about this problem see Jia (1991).
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resources was biased towards the industrial sectors, especially to the heavy 
industrial sectors; the orientation of industrial production was towards a 
lopsided self-service direction in a sort of autocircle instead of serving 
agricultural modernization; and the change of the employment structure in 
agriculture and industry was far behind the change of the production 
structure. Therefore, we can say that the Chinese industrial expansion was 
actually realized at the expense of agriculture. Thirdly, we think that there 
are three factors impairing the establishment of an organic and dynamic 
technological linkage between the two sectors: technology, policy and 
regulation. Fourthly, we suggest the Chinese to learn from the Japanese 
early industrialization experience which went through a simultaneous ex­
tensive and intensive growth with a combined capital intensive and labour 
intensive technology, using the advantages of investment opportunities in 
industry to expand agriculture and light industry first, and introducing the 
Western technology in such a creative way as to reach a successful assimila­
tion of it. Other policy recommendations include: reducing “the price 
scissors” between agricultural and industrial products; increasing the state 
agricultural investment; creating employment opportunities; promoting the 
free movement of labour force by expanding rural-township enterprises and 
small scale labour intensive industries; rescinding urban resident registering 
controls; and stimulating the improvement of industrial efficiency.
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Arab financial assistance to  developing—particularly Arab— countries rose sharply between 
1973 and 1980 b u t fell gradually through the 1980s, owing mainly to  weakening oil prices. As a 
percent o f  GNP, however, Arab contributions remain the largest among major donors. Occa­
sional Paper 87  surveys the volume and distribution o f Arab financing from 1973 to  1989.
ISBN 1-55775-180-3_________ Price: U S$15.00 ($12.00 for university faculty and students)
GHANA: ADJUSTMENT AND GROWTH, 19 8 3 -9 1  
by Ish a n  K a p u r , e t  al.
The first sub-Saharan African country to  pursue broad economic and structural reform—with 
the help o f external finance and technical aid— Ghana is a good example o f  adjustment with 
growth. Its experience illustrates the need for complementary policy actions and the right 
sequencing and speed o f reforms, according to  Occasional Paper 86.
ISBN 1-55775-182-X Price: U S$10.00 each ($7.50 for university faculty and students)
Order From: Publication Services • Box No. E-648
International Monetary Fund • 700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20431, U.S.A. •  Telephone (202) 623-7430 • FAX (202) 623-7201
E D I Z I O N I  C E D A M P A D O V A
Recentissima:
MICHELE PIZZO
L’« INTEREST RATE SWAP »
NEI CONTI E NEI BILANCI D’IMPRESA
(Dipartimento di economia aziendale dell’Università di Napoli. 
Studi di ragioneria e di economia aziendale, n. 3)
1990. In 8°, di pp. X-200 
ISBN 88-13-17210-9 L. 32.000
I n d ic e . — Introduzione. — I: Descrizione preliminare dell’« interest rate 
swap ». -  II: L’interpretazione economica dello strumento. -  III: La conta­
bilizzazione secondo la teoria e la prassi. — IV: L’iscrizione nei conti e nei 
bilanci delle imprese non finanziarie. -  V: L’iscrizione nei conti e nei bilanci 
delle imprese finanziarie. -  VI: La chiusura anticipata dell’operazione. -  
Conclusioni.
IN VENDITA NELLE MIGLIORI LIBRERIE E PRESSO I NOSTRI AGENTI
Per gli abbonati l'accesso a 
servizio avviene attraverso la rete te le fonica 
pubblica, utilizzando due numeri verdi, a cui risponde 
automaticamente il sistema MULTIFAX,
Utilizzando il vostro fax o P.C., potete inviare i vostri 
messaggi a ll1 ITALCABLE che provvederà alla 
ritrasmissione secondo le modalità da voi richieste e
potrete trasmettere lo stesso 
messaggio fino  a 99 liste di 
indirizzi contemporaneamente. 
In qualsiasi momento è pos­
sibile interrogare il sistema, 
d ig itando sul vostro fax un 
num ero breve, e ricevere in fo rm azion i sulla 
situazione dei messaggi inviati.
MULTIFAX mette direttamente a vostra disposizione 
la tecnologia avanzata dei sistemi ITALCABLE per 




che mette a vostra disposizione 
una rete privata dedicata alla 
trasmissione dei fax.
Per ulteriori notizie
1/90 Servizio Informazioni IMUMItomahlo
E D I Z I O N I  C E D A M P A D O V A
ANTEO GENOVESE
LA NOZIONE GIURIDICA 
DELL’IMPRENDITORE
1990. In 8°, di pp. XII-318 
ISBN 88-13-16788-1 L. 52.000
I n d i c e . -  I: L’imprenditore in generale. -  II: L’imprenditore agricolo. 
— Ili: L’imprenditore commerciale. — IV: Il piccolo imprenditore. — V: 
Gli enti pubblici come imprenditori. -  VI: Le società e le associazioni 
non riconosciute come imprenditori. — VII: La società cooperativa « pu­
ra » come imprenditore. — V ili: La società di mutua assicurazione 
« pura » come imprenditore. -  IX: I consorzi e le società consortili 
« pure » come imprenditori. — Ind ici.
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E RICUSAZIONE DEL GIUDICE CIVILE
(« Processo e giudizio ». Collana diretta da Giuseppe Tarzia, n. 4)
1991. In 8°, di pp. XII-344 
ISBN 88-13-17401-2 L. 45.000
I n d i c e . — I: La natura e gli effetti delle incompatibilità giudiziarie. — II: L’inter­
pretazione delle ipotesi di incompatibilità funzionale. — III: Le incompatibilità di 
servizio ed organiche come motivi di astensione e ricusazione ex art. 36 lettera g) 
c.p.p.. — IV: L’interesse del giudice nella causa. — V: I motivi di incompatibilità 
funzionale determinati dalla relazione del giudice con le parti della causa. — VI: 
La precedente cognizione dell’oggetto del processo. — VII: L’astensione del giudi­
ce. — V ili: Il processo di ricusazione del giudice.
IN VENDITA NELLE MIGLIORI LIBRERIE E PRESSO I NOSTRI AGENTI
E D I Z I O N I  C E D A M P A D O V A
MAURO RUBINO-SAMMARTANO
L’ARBITRATO INTERNAZIONALE
1989. In 8°, di pp. XXII-932 





1991. In 8°, di pp. XX-584 
ISBN 88-13-17265-6 L. 70.000
Indice. -  Introduzione. — Vane prima: Parte generale. -  I: Arbitrato ed istituti confinanti. -  II: 
La natura dell’arbitrato. — III:. Le fonti del diritto dell’arbitrato. — IV: Mandato congiunto a 
transigere (il c.d. arbitrato improprio). — V: Le categorie dell’arbitrato interno, estero ed 
internazionale. — Parte seconda: Arbitrato interno. — VI: Controversie compromettibili e ambito 
dei rimedi arbitrali. — VII: La convenzione arbitrale. — V ili: Le parti dell’arbitrato. — IX: Gli 
arbitri. — X: Ruolo delle camere arbitrali. — XI: Legge sostanziale applicabile. — XII: 
L’arbitrato e l’ordine pubblico. -  XIII: La fase introduttiva. -  XIV: La fase intermedia della 
trattazione. -  XV: I provvedimenti cautelari. -  XVI: La prova. -  XVII: La decisione arbitrale.
-  XVIII: Conseguenze della distinzione tra arbitrati interni, esteri e internazionali. -  XIX: 
Deposito ed esecuzione della decisione arbitrale. -  XX: Le impugnazioni. -  Parte terza: 
Arbitrati esteri e internazionali — Esecuzione e riconoscimento di decisioni straniere. — XXI: 
Procedimenti non qualificabili come interni. — XXII: Riconoscimento ed esecuzione delle 
decisioni arbitrali straniere ed internazionali. -  Parte quarta: La riforma del diritto dell’arbitrato.
-  XXIII: Riforma dell’arbitrato. -  Bibliografia. — Indice analitico.
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